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Scholars are usually attracted to South America because of the 
characterization of this zone of the Western Hemisphere as a zone with a “long 
peace”. However, almost 200 years after achieving independence from Spain 
and Portugal, some countries are still facing unsolved territorial and boundary 
disputes. Thus, the purpose of this thesis is to assess the importance the 
balance of power has in the inter-state relationships in the Western Hemisphere.  
This thesis argues that Plan Colombia is creating an imbalance of military 
power between Colombia and Venezuela and this balance is important to their 
relations. Three possible explanations are used to explore the relations between 
these two countries, which are democratic peace, balance of power, and spiral 
model.  The major conclusion of this thesis is that the implementation of  U.S. 
policy in the region is creating an imbalance of power, and that the situation 
could lead the unbalanced country to increase military capabilities. The long 
history of misperceptions of the capabilities and intentions of the adversary 
could provide the dynamics that might trigger a war. Therefore, this U.S. policy is 
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Since 1964, Colombia has been engaged in an internal war with leftist 
insurgents. For more than 40 years, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and the smaller National Liberation Army (ELN) have 
continued to attack democratic institutions and civil society to achieve their goals. 
Narcotics trafficking, extortion and kidnapping now fuel these groups, and are a 
direct threat to Colombian democratic institutions and their ability to meet the 
people’s economic and social needs.  
United States policy has been to give assistance to Colombia that is 
directed solely at the fight against narcotics trafficking. Since 1999, the United 
States has been working with Colombia to reduce coca production dramatically in 
accordance with “Plan Colombia.”  Bogotá’s “Plan Colombia”, a multifaceted 
response to the Colombia’s political and military upheaval, has taken as one of 
its central goals the reassertion of military authority in areas currently controlled 
by guerrillas.  
The United States’ response to Colombia’s crisis has been an explicit 
emphasis on support for the military’s counter-narcotics operations. The bulk of 
U.S. military assistance, with billions of dollars allocated to this purpose, will 
support the Colombian armed forces.  
The second-oldest democracy in Latin America, Colombia is a 
strategically important country that lies adjacent to Venezuela’s oil fields, the 
Panama Canal, and the Caribbean basin. 
Venezuela and Colombia do not share just a common 2,219 km border. 
They are countries joined by similar historical, ethical, cultural and economical 
identities. However, some discrepancies are present among these neighbor 
countries. The long-lasting Colombian-Venezuelan relationship is one of the most 
conflictual in Latin America. “The two countries dispute thirty-four points along 
2 
their border, and illegal immigration, transborder guerrilla activity and smuggling 
heighten Venezuelan concern about Colombia.”1  
The military assistance provided to “Plan Colombia” is changing the 
military capabilities of Colombia. This has the potential to alter the balance of 
power between Colombia and Venezuela.  
This thesis examines the relevance of the balance of power in the 
Western Hemisphere. Using a single case study, this thesis assesses the 
implications of the implementation of Plan Colombia on the balance of power 
relations in the Venezuelan-Colombian dyad.  
This work attempts to answer two major questions: Is Plan Colombia 
creating an imbalance of military power in the region? Does it matter? The sub- 
questions complementing this work are: Is the balance of power theory relevant 
in Latin America? Is the balance of power theory or “zone of peace/democratic 
peace” theory better at explaining Colombia-Venezuela relations? What are the 
expectations after the implementation of Plan Colombia in the region? 
B. BACKGROUND 
The alternation of war and peace has been one of the main characteristics 
of human history. Ever since Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War 
over 2,400 years ago, scholars from a wide range of disciplines have studied war 
in the hope of facilitating efforts to prevent its occurrence, reduce its frequency, 
or mitigate its consequences.2 Thus, “war has been throughout history a normal 
way of conducting disputes between political groups.”3  
South America is not far from this interstate relation of war and peace. 
However, unlike other areas of the developing world, South America has been 
one of the most harmonious regions in terms of the absence of international 
wars. In fact, Latin America represents a theoretical puzzle for the scholars 
                                            
1 David Mares, Strategic Balance and Confidence Building Measures an Latin America: The 
Historical Utility of an Ambiguous Concept, in Strategic Balance and Confidence Building 
Measures in the Americas. The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, D.C., 1998. p. 154.  
2 Robert Strassler, History of the Pelonnesian War, quoted by Jack Levy, War and Peace, 
“Handbook of International Relations” (2002) p. 350. 
3 Michael Howard, The Causes of War, in “Turbulence Peace” (2003) p. 29. 
3 
studying International Relations. They are usually attracted to the region because 
of the characterization of this zone of the Western Hemisphere as a zone with a 
“long peace”.4 
Analysts of international conflict tend to ignore South America, believing 
that little military conflict exists and that whatever wars in which these nations 
engage are minor.5 However, almost 200 years after achieving independence 
from Spain and Portugal, some countries in this particular region are still facing 
unsolved territorial and boundary disputes. The most serious interstate conflicts 
involving Central America, South America, or Caribbean countries in the last third 
of the 20th century were directly related to territorial or boundary disputes.  
One of the best examples is the long-standing Colombian–Venezuelan 
dyad because during these years, claims on territory led to disputes between the 
two countries. The Gulf of Venezuela dispute is a good example of a territorial 
dispute that becomes far more serious when a valuable resource, in this case oil, 
is involved. The key to establishing control of the disputed territories is ownership 
of the Los Monjes Islands, a chain of three tiny islands lying at the gulf's northern 
mouth. At stake in the dispute is the control over a substantial amount of 
maritime territory in the Caribbean that extends into the gulf, an area popularly 
referred to by Colombians as the Coquibacoa Gulf. 
By gaining recognition of its claim to the islands, which are said to be all 
but submerged at high tide, Colombia could expand its national territory into the 
Caribbean by declaring the extension of its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone around the islands. It would also be able to claim a portion of the waters of 
the gulf, located next to Venezuela's oil-rich Lago de Maracaibo, which, 
according to estimates of possible reserves, might contain as much as 10 billion 
barrels of oil.6  
                                            
4 For more in this concept see Arie Kacowicz (1998), Jorge Dominguez (1998). 
5 David Mares. Violent Peace: Military Interstate Bargaining in Latin America. Columbia 
University Press. New York. (2001) p. 28. 
6 Rafael Schwartz, Los Monjes: Conflicto entre Venezuela y Colombia. Bonalde Editores. 
Caracas. 1993. P-173. Translated by Omar Pina. p. 166. 
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Several skirmishes concerning territorial discrepancies have occurred 
throughout the history of these two nations. In August 1987, Colombian warships, 
including the missile frigate Caldas, entered disputed waters at the mouth of the 
gulf, Colombian Mirage fighters reportedly conducted over flights of the area and 
Venezuelan F-16 fighters were moved to a nearby air base which conducted 
several flights over the Colombian missile frigate. Open hostilities appeared 
imminent. Even after the withdrawal of the Colombian vessels by order of 
President Virgilio Barco Vargas, the armed forces of both nations remained on 
alert in the border area. The Venezuelan government maintained that the 
vessels' presence in the gulf for three full days represented an act of "intentional 
provocation" and sent a "strongly worded" formal protest to the Colombian 
president.7 
The “Caldas Incident” had military implications for both sides. The military 
potential of Colombia and Venezuela, compared with other Andean countries, is 
high. During this skirmish, both countries tested their military capabilities and 
discovered their weaknesses in the strategic and operational environment. 
However, what exactly is the size of the military component of these two 
countries? Has the military size in these two countries changed considerably 
after the last skirmish? 
In their interstate relations, the balance of power has played an essential 
role because “strategic equilibrium” has been present. This thesis argues that 
this equilibrium or military balance among a group of states is important to 
maintain peace.  
The introduction of “Plan Colombia” as an alternative to solve the long-
running fight against the narcotics trafficking,  nowadays called “narco-terrorism”, 
is allocating  considerable military assistance to Colombia. This increase in 
military capabilities is creating an imbalance of power in the region. This is 
problematic because the balance of power still plays an important role in 
interstate relations in South America  
                                            
7 Schwartz. p. 175. 
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C. SIGNIFICANCE 
The essential feature of international politics is that states interact in a 
state of anarchy. The theory of “Balance of Power,” which results from that 
anarchy, still plays an important role in international politics today. Although 
some theorists of democratic peace argue otherwise, the balance of power is still 
important in inter-American relations. In some cases, as expressed by David 
Mares, deterrence represents the key to conflict management by directly 
affecting the cost of using force. Perhaps one good example of conflict 
management in the region through deterrence is the long lasting Colombian-
Venezuelan territorial dispute.  
Military force has consistently been used in foreign policies in Latin 
America.8 Although Latin American international relations unfold today within a 
zone of relative peace, and insecurities arising from threats of hostile cross 
border attacks are not an aspect of most Latin Americans’ concerns, there is a 
historical preoccupation with strategic balances in the region, including their 
military components. 
Hence, the importance of this project is the study of the impact of the 
military implementation of Plan Colombia on the military balance of power 
between Colombia and Venezuela. To what extent is South America really a 
“zone of peace”? Does balance of power really “matter” in inter-American 
relations?   
This work is also important for U.S policy-makers because it will examine 
possible responses that the Venezuelan government will make in the near future 




                                            
8 David Mares in Violent Peace: Military Interstate Bargaining in Latin America presented a 
list of 23 wars in which Latin American nations participated after their wars of independence. Of 
the 23 wars, 17 have been among Latin American nations. According to Mares war also had 
implications for the regional distribution of power. Mares (2001), p. 35. 
6 
D. METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In terms of methodology, this research design follows the case study 
method. This thesis will test the balance of power and zone of peace theories in 
South America with a single case study. The use of the case study of relations 
between Colombia and Venezuela will demonstrate that an imbalance of military 
power exists between these two states after the military implementation of Plan 
Colombia. 
The focus of this thesis will be identifying antecedent conditions to 
conflictual or peaceful relations in the Colombia and Venezuela dyad and 
explaining the importance of the balance of power in the security stability for 
these two countries. Antecedent conditions are territorial disputes, military power 
and democracy.  
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis will be organized in the following manner. Chapter II will 
provide an introduction to some basic concepts in this particular field of political 
science. Then, this chapter will present a literature review of the major theoretical 
debates regarding the research question. It will include theoretical arguments 
concerning the balance of power in the region. To summarize, the purpose of this 
chapter is to provide the reader with the necessary analytical framework for 
understanding and appreciating the research question. More specifically, this 
chapter will review existing arguments regarding the categorization of South 
America as a “zone of peace” and the importance the balance of power still has 
in the region. This chapter will also introduce the concept of the spiral model, 
which indicates possible risks that arise when countries attempt to restore an 
altered balance of power. 
Chapter III will analyze the Colombian-Venezuela dyad. Using the history 
of the Colombian-Venezuela territorial disputes, this chapter will demonstrate 
how the balance of power has played an important role in the relations between 
these two South American countries, with special attention paid to time periods 
and regime type (Pre-Cold War/ Cold War/Post-Cold War; Democracy-
7 
Democracy/Dictatorship-Democracy), territorial disputes, and military power. 
Next, the theories on the balance of power will be tested against the case study.  
Chapter IV will cover the United States policy in the region. What influence 
has Plan Colombia as a United States policy had on regional security? How is 
the United States’ response to Colombia’s crisis affecting the region with a focus 
on the Colombia-Venezuela relations? In summary, this chapter will concentrate 
on the relative impact of the implementation of Plan Colombia on these two 
countries’ military capabilities. It will show how military aid to Colombia is a 
disservice to regional military stability. What is the likely impact on Venezuela-
Colombia relations and Venezuelan defense policy? 
Chapter V will summarize the conclusions.  If Plan Colombia is creating an 
imbalance of military power in the region, some reaction is expected from the 
countries affected. In this case study, Plan Colombia is likely to increase tensions 
and instability in the long-lasting Colombian-Venezuelan dyad. The military 
implementation of Plan Colombia destroyed the military equilibrium and no clear 
perception of the intentions of the neighboring country exists concerning new 
military capacities. This chapter presents some recommendations for the United 
States policy makers as well as for the Venezuelan government. The most 
important step would be for Venezuela and Colombia to make new efforts to 
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II. INTERSTATE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA: BALANCE 
OF POWER OR ZONE OF PEACE? 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a literature review of the major 
theoretical debates relevant to the research question. An explanation of the basic 
concepts (power, anarchy) used in this theoretical framework will be covered in 
the first part. Second, this chapter will explain the balance of power theory as a 
basis for this thesis. Next, literature on the characterization of South America as 
a “zone of peace” or zone of “violence peace” is reviewed. Finally, the possible 
relevance of the spiral model is discussed. Basically, this chapter will suggest the 
importance that the balance of power still plays in the region. Hypotheses derived 
from this literature review will be applied to the case study in subsequent 
chapters.   
A. POWER 
It is necessary to define the terms used before discussing the theoretical 
framework of this thesis.  
The concept of power has been the main theme for student of politics, 
especially for the realist. As presented by Michael Sullivan, power based theories 
traditionally consist of the realpolitik view that nations operate solely for their own 
interest, that their interest focuses on the question of the nation’s power, that all 
nations interact with one another over the question of power, and that power is 
the ultimate goal of states.9  
Nonetheless, it is still impossible to define the concept of power with 
several sentences because it is subjective to the perception or understanding of 
each person or group or state involved in the relationship.10  Therefore, it is more 
meaningful to sort various kinds of definitions by their characteristics in order to 
grasp the concept of power. 
                                            
9 Michael Sullivan, “Power in Contemporary Politics”, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict (1990), p. 9. 
10 David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” 
World Politics, Vol. XXXI, N°2, January 1979, pp. 161-194. 
10 
Jeffrey Hart stipulates three main approaches to the observation and 
measurement of power: the first is control over resources, the second control 
over actors, and the third control over events and outcomes. The control over the 
resources approach is the most widely used and accepted approach to the study 
of national power. The frequent indicators of national power are military 
expenditures, the size of the armed forces, gross national product, and 
population.11  
According to Jeffrey Hart, the control over actors approach is perhaps the 
most familiar to political scientists. He based his argument on Robert Dahl’s 
definition of power as the ability of A to get B to do something which he would 
otherwise not do. This, according to Hart “is a control over actors definition, and 
has not been greatly improved upon since its appearance in 1957.”12  
The power as control over events and outcomes, developed by James 
Coleman, is based on a rational choice theory of power, in which the reason for 
controlling resources or other actors arises out of the desire to achieve certain 
outcomes. These outcomes are social states which are the result of individual or 
collective action and which are mutually exclusive. According to Jeffrey Hart:  
The control over events and outcomes approach emerges as the 
best approach for measurement of power in contemporary 
international politics because: 1) is the only approach which takes 
into account the possibility of interdependence among actors and of 
collective actions; 2) it is the more general than the other 
approaches; 3) it produces a type of analysis which has both 
descriptive and normative advantages over the types of analysis 
which are associated which are associated with other 
approaches.13 
It is important, in order to understand the conceptualization, to make a 
distinction between power and force. 
                                            
11 Jeffrey Hart, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations” 
International Organization, Vol. 30, No 2 (Spring, 1976). p. 289.    
12 Jeffrey Hart (1976), p. 291. 
13 Ibid., p. 303. 
11 
Political power must be distinguished from force in the sense of the 
actual exercise of physical violence. The threat of physical violence 
in the form of police action, imprisonment, capital punishment, or 
war is an intrinsic element of politics. When violence becomes an 
actuality, it signifies the abdication of political power in favor of 
military or pseudo military power.  In international politics in 
particular, armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most 
important material factor making for the political power of a 
nation.14 
When physical violence replaces the psychological relation between two 
minds, it means the substitution of military power for political power. In summary, 
power can be defined as 
the ability of one nation to proactively influence the behavior of 
other states in its self-interest, using a combination of its resources 
and capabilities. Thus, in the conceptualization of power, it is the 
interaction of certain factors that provides a country with the ability 
to influence others.15 
Power is a reality and it can be perceived in the simplest aspects of life. 
However, power is also an abstraction, not a real thing. It exists in every 
relationship of people but with different postures including the national and 
international level.  Both domestic and international politics “are a struggle for 
power, modified only by the different conditions under which this struggle takes 
place in the domestic and in the international spheres.”16  
The struggle for power “is universal in time and space and is an 
undeniable fact of experience.”17 Hence, all states try to obtain some sort of 
power with the purpose of preventing any nation from becoming strong enough to 
threaten their independence. This relationship of the distribution of power among 
states, particularly in some countries in Latin America, is part of the study in this 
thesis. 
 
                                            
14 Ibid., p. 29. 
15 Miguel Navarro, “A Chilean Perspective on Strategic Balance” in Strategic Balance and 
Confidence Building Measures in the Americas, (1998) p. 26. 
16 Ibid., p.35. 
17 Ibid., p. 34. 
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B. BALANCE OF POWER 
1. Definitions and Characteristics 
The traditional literature on the causes of war has been dominated by the 
realist paradigm, a system-level approach that incorporates several distinct 
theories.18 These theories all posit that the key actors are sovereign states that 
act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth in the anarchic system. 
The main characteristic of this anarchic system is the lack of a legitimate 
authority to regulate disputes and enforce agreements between states. In other 
words, anarchy defines the “socio/political framework in which international 
relations occurs.”19 
“Anarchy,” rather than denoting chaos or rampant disorder, refers in 
international politics to the fact that there is no central authority capable of 
making and enforcing rules of behavior on the international system’s units 
(states). 
According to Levy, this anarchy, along with “uncertainties regarding the 
present and future intentions of the adversary, induces political leaders to focus 
on short-term security needs and on their relative position in the system, adopt 
worst-case thinking, build up their military strength, and utilize coercive threats to 
advance their interest, influence the adversary, and maintain their reputation.”20  
In the anarchic international environment, national states/regions are 
fearful of each other because states have the ability to act in ways that hurt the 
interest of other states. Security thus becomes the first priority.  
                                            
18 About this fact, Andrew Ross made some arguments in his work “The Theory & Practice 
of International Relations: Contending Analytical Perspectives”. According to Ross “the central 
concern of realism is war and peace. Since it is war that most threatens the survival of peoples 
and states, realists focus on war, particularly major power war, the causes of war, and how it 
might be prevented. Realist practitioners, consequently, are preoccupied with maintaining 
national security against external military threats.” In the same subject he quoted Joseph Nye 
“Realism has been the dominant tradition in thinking about international politics.” See; Strategy 
and Force Planning (1997) p. 47. 
19 Graham Evans, Jeffry Newnham. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. 
(1998) p. 18. 
20 Jack Levy. Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War. In Crocker, C., et al. Turbulent 
Peace. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. p. 7. 
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Countries often try to gain security by increasing military expenditures. 
Since an arms race is a perpetual possibility, one’s military superiority will often 
be equaled or surpassed by others’ military build-up efforts. Absolute security is, 
as a result, impossible. Therefore, all countries are trapped in a “Security 
Dilemma.” 21  
Consequently, how can international outcomes be determined? Jack Levy 
explains that “the core realist hypothesis is that international outcomes are 
determined by, or at least are significantly constrained by, the distribution of 
power between two or more states, though different conceptions of power and of 
the nature of the system lead to different theories and different predictions about 
what those specifics outcomes are.”22 
There are two structural theories in international politics. One is the 
hegemonic theory and the other is the balance of power theory. These theories 
are intended to explain, predict, and describe the characteristics of the 
international system and, in general, the behavior of states. These theories of 
international politics have focused on describing great power behavior, because 
the assumption  is that international relations are largely ruled by the great 
powers of the contemporary system. 
Hegemony is a contentious notion in the study of international relations, 
particularly in the security realm. A hegemon is not just paramount, but is defined 
by its ability to provide a collective good, in this case, peaceful interstate 
relations. A regional hegemon is a state that can impose constraints on the use 
of force by regional states.  In the Andean region, only the United States might 
be able to exercise such hegemony. However, Mares argues that “though the 
U.S. is uniquely powerful, it is not a hegemon that provides the collective good of 
peace among nations of the region in which they have their own interest.”23 
                                            
21 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma”, World Politics, Vol. 
2(1950), pp. 157-158  
22 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Robert Keohane, ed Neorealism and Its Critics 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). Quoted by Levy (2003), p. 7. 
23 Mares (2001). p. 83. 
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Hence, the balance of power is more applicable to the Andean region because all 
the states can hope to compete with each other. 
This thesis will focus on the “Balance of Power”, because this “theory 
posits that the avoidance of hegemony is the primary goal of states and that the 
maintenance of an equilibrium of power in the system is an essential means to 
that end.”24 Also, “hegemonic theories share realist assumptions but de-
emphasize the importance of anarchy while emphasizing system management 
within a hierarchical order.”25 The Balance of Power theory, which results from 
international anarchy, will be discussed here as still playing an important role in 
international relations in the region today. 
When discussing the balance of power, the beginning assumptions about 
states are:  
They are unitary actors who at minimum seek their own 
preservation and, at maximum, drive for universal domination. 
States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways 
to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view.26  
Explained simply, the balance of power theory proposes that if an equal 
distribution of power exists among states then there is an international 
equilibrium in terms of power, and peace is more likely. 
The notion of the balance of power as a general principle had its origins in 
the philosophers of India, China, and ancient Greece. It later appeared in 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, guided the actions of great statesmen such as Richilieu, 
Cromwell, and Bismarck27; and was popularized as a theory in the United States 
thanks to the work of Han Morgenthau.   
                                            
24 Jack Levy. War and Peace. Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks, SAGE 
Publications.(2002). p. 254. 
25 Ibid., p. 355. 
26 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (1979), p. 118. 
27 Hans Morgenthau, Política Entre Las Naciones: La Lucha por el Poder y a Paz. Grupo 
Editor Latinoamericano. Buenos Aires. 1986.  
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Prof. Hans Morgenthau believed that the “Balance of Power” referred to 
the reality in which power was shared equally by a group of countries.28 In the 
eyes of traditional Realists, the most direct and fundamental goal of one’s foreign 
policy is to acquire power. This is because the only thing that can prevent any 
single country from being strong enough to threaten others’ independence is the 
policy of a “Balance of Power”.  Prof. Morgenthau also pointed out that a group of 
countries hoping to maintain or break the status quo would finally come to the 
structure of the “Balance of Power” and adopt the necessary policies to sustain 
such a structure.29 
States try to use the means available to them in order to achieve their 
interests. According to Waltz, these means fall into two categories: internal 
efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to 
develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge 
one’s own alliance or to weaken or shrink an opposite one).30  
The representative figure of New Realism, Prof. Kenneth Waltz, bases his 
theory of the balance of power on a critique of the earlier currents of the school of 
realism, whether traditional or linked to the school of scientism.31 Waltz once 
said, “Rational countries living in the state of anarchy and the security dilemma 
would be suspicious of and hostile to each other because of their tense relations, 
although that was not their original idea.”32 Thus, with respect to what constitutes 
the ultimate interest for a nation, Morgenthau pointed to power, Waltz to security. 
Waltz also maintains that the “balance of power theory is a theory about the  
                                            
28 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations- The Struggle for Power and Peace (1973), 
p.211  
29 Ibid., p. 211. 
30 Waltz, (1978), p. 118. 
31 Marcela Donadio and Luis Tibiletti. Strategic Balance and Regional Security in the 
Southern Cone. In Strategic Balances and Confidence Building Measures in the Americas. 
Stanford University Press. 1998. p. 95. 
32 Kenneth Waltz, Theories of International Politics, Mc Graw-Hill. New York. 1992, p. 122. 
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results produced by the uncoordinated actions of states. The theory makes 
assumptions about the interest and motives of states, rather than explaining 
them.”33 
Thus, as can be seen, the balance of power has a significant number of 
meanings and interpretations. This thesis only focuses on two: the balance of 
power as a situation and as a policy. As a situation, the balance of power 
basically means equilibrium, “it is a purely descriptive term, designed to indicate 
the character of a situation in which the power relationship between states or 
groups of states is one of rough or precise equality.”34 Being that the balance of 
power is a relation of equality, and sometimes a condition of disequilibrium 
exists, occasionally it is used or identified as a “policy of promoting the creation 
or the preservation of equilibrium.”35 As presented by Claude: 
In a multistate system, the only policy which promises to prevent 
such behavior (stronger power with the temptation to dominate, to 
oppress, to conquer) is that of confronting power with a 
countervailing power; stability, survival, protection of national rights 
and interest demand that power be neutralized by equivalent 
power. In these terms balance of power is a policy of prudence.  
However, power analysts disagree about whether parity or preponderance 
diminished the likelihood of military conflict. Most of the time, the theoretical 
literature on the distribution of power and war examines the question from a 
systemic perspective.36 Consequently, policymakers in Latin America often focus 
on the regional or bilateral distribution of power to explain military conflict. 
For this reason, if the balance of power theorists are correct, parity should 
mean both fewer wars and less violent militarization of disputes. The reasoning is 
simple, Parity brings peace because neither side can be reasonably sure of 
winning a war at an acceptable cost. According to Mares, the parity theses find 
                                            
33 Donadio and Tibiletti. p. 95. 
34 Inis Claude, Power and International Relations, (1967) p. 13. 
35 Ibid., p. 18. 
36 Bremer, Stuart. “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 
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strong support in the major crises and wars in the last 26 years in Latin America.  
Out of 14 disputes, only three involve parity and none escalated, Peru-Chile in 
1976, Colombia-Venezuela in 1986, and Venezuela-Colombia in 1993. 
The power preponderance argument takes a different approach. Rather 
than see peace resulting from powers of relatively equal military strength 
balancing each other, preponderance analysts perceive peace to result from one 
power deterring challengers through its significantly greater power. In Mare’s 
study, Violent Peace: Military Interstate Bargaining in Latin America, the 
preponderance argument is rejected for the last 26 years because all three wars 
in the period involved preponderance, and it was the weaker state that engaged 
in provocative behavior. Hence, the balance of power is a better fit with the 
realities in Latin America, and will be used as a source of hypotheses regarding 
the Colombian-Venezuelan dyad. 
The concept of the balance of power can be a useful tool in explaining the 
behavior of states. This is because it is founded on the assumption that all states 
act to preserve their own self interest. Thus, the international stage features 
many independent actors each seeking their own best interests and security. 
This idea is valid for all states, from north to south and from the first to third world 
countries. They all seek to maintain their own interests. The following areas in 
this chapter will cover some theories regarding the issue of the balance of power 
in Latin America and the characterization of Latin America as a zone of peace.  
C. LATIN AMERICA AS A ZONE OF PEACE 
Are democracies more peaceful in their foreign relations? If so, what are 
the theoretical explanations of this phenomenon? Immanuel Kant posited that a 
republican form of government, exemplifying the rule of law, provides a feasible 
basis for states to overcome structural anarchy and to secure peaceful relations 
among themselves.37 
                                            
37 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, translated by Lewis White Beck. New Tork: Bobbs-
Merril, 1957, in Steve Chan “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise”, Mershon 
International Studies Review, Vol. 41 N°1 (May 1997) 
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“Democratic peace theory explicitly holds that it is the very nature of 
democratic political system that accounts for the fact that democracies do not 
fight or threaten other democracies.”38 The theory advances two alternative 
explanations. The first is institutional constraints and the second is democratic 
norms and cultures. Institutional constraints explain that democratic governments 
are reluctant to go to war because they must answer to their citizens.39 Citizens 
pay the price for war in blood and treasure. If the price of conflict is high, 
democratic governments may fall victim to electoral retribution. The democratic 
norm explanation holds that “the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit 
compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without threat of violence 
within countries come to apply across national boundaries toward other 
democratic countries.”40 In other words, democratic states develop positive 
perceptions of other democracies. 
In sum, political liberalism has long argued that different kinds of states 
are likely to behave in different ways and that democratic or republican states are 
likely to be more peaceful.  
However, domestically insecure liberalizing states in unstable 
neighborhoods pose potential problems for regional security. During the last 
years of the 20th Century, five Latin America boundary disputes between 
neighboring states have resulted in the use of force.41 One good example is 
Ecuador and Peru when they went to war in 1995, resulting in more than 1,000 
casualties with negative results for both economies. 
In this dilemma between war and peace, the distribution of power has 
played an important role in Latin American. According to Mares,  
                                            
38 Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, International 
Security, Vol. 19, N°2 (Autumn, 1994) p. 8. 
39 Michael Doyle. “Kant. Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, pp. 205-235 quoted by 
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40 Ibid., p. 9. 
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military force has consistently been used in the foreign policies of 
Latin American countries. The twentieth century has seen more 
than two hundred instances in which Latin American states either 
threatened or used military force or were the subject of such threats 
or force by non- Latin American countries.42  
That Being the case, the question is to what extent is South America really 
a “zone of peace?” Does the balance of power really “matter” in inter-American 
relations?   
The struggle for most scholars involved in this area of study is to solve 
unusual characteristics in this part of the Western Hemisphere. Among some of 
the questions in the puzzle are: Why do territorial, boundary, and other disputes 
endure? Why is interstate conflict over boundaries relatively frequent? Why is 
interstate war infrequent? In fact, what appears to be very interesting for most 
scholars is that by international standards, Latin America was relatively free from 
interstate war during the 20th century.  
Dr. Arie Kacowicz in his book, “Zones of Peace in the International 
System”, tried to explain the preservation of peace in different regions of the 
world characterized by the absence of international wars for extended periods of 
time. He intended to explain the phenomenon of zones of peace (negative 
peace) in the Third World comparing South America with West Africa.43  
Kacowicz defined the “zone of peace“ as a discrete geographical region of 
the world in which a group of states have maintained peaceful relations among 
themselves for a period of at least 30 years, although civil wars and domestic 
unrest and violence might still occur within their borders, as well as international 
conflicts and crisis among them.44  
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Kacowicz also mentioned that “zones of peace in the international system 
develop when states are conservatives in their territorial claims; in other words, 
when they are satisfied with the status quo within their borders and across 
them.”45  
Particularly in the South American region, Kacowicz explained that the 
absence of international wars and relative isolation from the Cold War 
confrontation has led this region to recognize and promote a zone of peace, 
meaning a comprehensive concept of stable peace, disarmament and a 
democratic perspective on regional security. In summary, his focus in explaining 
the concept of zone of peace in this region can be categorized with the following: 
…with the absence of international wars, assessing why in South 
America there has been an inclination to deal with international 
disputes rather than to fight over them, and examining how this 
one-hundred-years zone of peace was upgraded from the mere 
absence of war (negative peace) to stable peace and the 
impossibility of war...and finally inched in the direction of a 
pluralistic security community in the 1990s.46   
Considering this argument, Kacowicz presented Latin America as a zone 
of peace. He stated that “the vast majority of border disputes in South America 
have been resolved peacefully, leading to some cession or exchange of 
territories.” Moreover, he expressed that “most of the South American conflicts 
have been satisfied with their territorial status quo, with the exception of Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Paraguay, and Argentina.” 47  
According to Kacowicz’s theoretical framework, the different explanations 
for the maintenance of South American peace can be grouped into three different 
descriptions. The first are the realist and geopolitical explanations such as the 
pacifying roles of the United States and Brazil or a regional balance of power, the  
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second are liberal explanations such as the effects of democratization, and the 
third is the satisfaction with the territorial status quo, derived from both domestic 
and international sources.48    
The realist and geopolitical explanation can be understood in part as the 
application of the hegemonic stability theory,49 but it also views this peace as a 
function of a balance of power system involving a complex and interrelated set of 
alliances and antagonism. In other words, Kacowicz see this region as practicing 
a comprehensive regional balance of power. 
In his work, Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers, 
Kacowicz presented some arguments explaining why democracies do not fight 
each other. He made an attempt to establish a correlation between democracies 
and territorial demands by posing the hypothesis that well established 
democracies do not fight each other since they are conservative powers, usually 
satisfied with the territorial status quo within and across their borders. This is 
what constitutes a liberal explanation. 
Finally, Kacowicz stated that “satisfaction with the status quo has been a 
crucial factor though not the sole one, in the maintenance of peace in South 
America.”50 In support of this conclusion, he noted: 
Irrespective of the changing nature of their political regimes 
throughout the twentieth century, the rise and decline of balance of 
power configurations and geopolitical doctrines, and the 
progression from independence towards interdependence most of 
the South American countries have been satisfied with the territorial 
status quo, following their national consolidation in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twenties.  
I will argue that some of these elements in Kacowicz’s explanations are 
not the exclusive causal mechanisms for considering Latin America as a zone of 
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peace. However, one part of his realist explanation is used to support the 
author’s argument that the balance of power is important to the region. Moreover, 
a case study explains how the influence of one of the region’s hegemons is 
creating an imbalance of military power in some countries in South America.  
Some scholars question the causal inference that democracies are at 
peace with each other simply because they are democratic. One of the 
hypotheses to explain the phenomenon is political stability makes peace. 
According to Russett,  
States with stable and durable political systems will lack incentives 
to externalize domestic discontent into conflict with foreign 
counties. They will be more reluctant to engage in conflict against 
other states that are politically stable.51 
This hypothesis is appropriate to explain some cases of inter-state 
disputes in Latin America, because some had experienced political instability. For 
Russett, unstable governments have more to gain from diversion and they do so 
when confronting an adversary that faces substantial domestic political problems. 
To some extent, this relationship applies to the case study presented in this work 
and introduced in Chapter IV.  
The ideas categorizing South America as a zone of peace relate more to 
international wars and the practical isolation from the direct confrontation of the 
Cold War. However, this so-called stable peace had other types of conflicts that 
in one way or another are important for inter-state relations of most countries in 
the region. The next section introduces a different approach to this categorization 
as well as  presenting this zone of the Western Hemisphere as a zone of violent 
peace.   
D. LATIN AMERICA ZONE AS A ZONE OF VIOLENT PEACE 
History shows that the danger of conflict in Latin America is always 
present. Although the risks are not high, they have generated recurring cycles of 
tensions between states in the various sub-regions.  
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According to David Mares, the use of violence across national boundaries 
has been a consistent trait of Latin America’s international politics. Violence in 
the region, he stated, escalates to war in much the same proportion as in the rest 
of the world, with the exception of the Middle East.52 
According to Mares,  
from 1980-97 there were at least 52 Militarized Interstate Disputes 
(MID). Of these MIDs 15 occurred among interstate dyads 
combining democratic and nondemocratic regimes, 27 MIDs were 
between democratic pairs and only 10 MIDs occurred among 
nondemocratic dyads.53  
Border demarcations dominate the list of current grievances in the region. 
Without overcoming the problems of defining territories, the region will continue 
to be a zone of danger and distrust.  
Thinking of international politics as a bargaining situation, Mares regards 
the decision to use military violence as a bargaining tactic rather than a decision 
to settle interstate disputes through war. The combination of political-military 
strategy chosen determines the costs of conflict, the strategic balance among the 
parties involved, and the characteristics of the force to be used.  
The hypothesis of Mares's militarized bargaining model is that force may 
be used if those costs are equal to or lower than the costs acceptable to the 
leader's constituency minus the degree by which policymakers are accountable 
to their constituencies. Force will not always be used when these conditions are 
met, but it will certainly not be used in their absence. Once militarized, the 
decision to escalate further follows the same logic. 
Mares demonstrates, with a variety of quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, that the three major paradigms purporting to explain the use of military 
force fail to challenge empirical evaluation (democratic peace paradigm, 
hegemonic management theory and distribution of power theories). He stated 
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that the distribution of power theories also fail to explain the use of force 
adequately. Although the author shows that neither parity nor preponderance 
correlates strongly with the decision to use force in Latin America's disputes, the 
“parity thesis finds a strong support in the case of major crisis and wars in the 
last 26 years”54 This means that none of the three wars in this period of time 
occurred in a context of military parity. In reality, it was the weaker power that 
was more likely to initiate militarized disputes in the region. 
Consequently, without resolving the question of borders, the general 
climate of relations in some Latin American countries will not change. Therefore, 
some zones or regions in Latin America should not be considered Zones of 
Peace. Unsolved border disputes still occur in Latin America. Thus, countries 
with territorial disputes become countries with security concerns. The prevalence 
of disputed territorial borders in the region means that the method of resolution of 
a particular conflict, whether diplomatic or military, takes on more general 
significance. For those countries, the balance of power is the tool used to 
maintain their own interest and security. 
The basic argument that governments pay attention to some notion of 
military balance applies to Latin American countries currently.55 This thesis uses 
as a case study one of the longest existing dyads in the Western Hemisphere. 
The long-standing Colombia- Venezuela relationship is one of the most 
conflictual in contemporary Latin America. Thus, the question is to what extent 
the balance of power has played an important role in this dyad? What role has 
liberal democracy played in these two countries? Does the balance of power 
really matter in the region?  
E. SPIRAL THEORY 
One of the most controversial issues in International Relations is the role 
of perceptions of the other state’s intentions. In this regard, one of the first 
theoretical perspectives that must be considered is the spiral model. The basic 
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premise of the spiral theory is that a state’s efforts to increase its security can 
sometimes backfire and produce insecurity or conflict instead.56 
This set of assumptions may give rise to a security dilemma in the sense 
that, if each negotiator seeks expansion of his or her own coercive capabilities to 
deter opposing negotiators, each will find in the opponent’s behavior an ultimate 
reason to expand further. 
Besides gathering coercive power, the security dilemma may give rise to 
coercive action as well. For example, Jervis observed that “the drive for security 
will also produce aggressive actions if the state either requires a very high sense 
of security or feels menaced by the very presence of other states.”57 
These interactions are affected by the perceptions of the other side. The 
central message Robert Jervis argues is that perception is profoundly theory 
driven, that decisionmakers tend to see what they expect to see, and that these 
expectations are often driven by stereotyped lessons of history, analogies, or 
routine scripts that provide shortcuts for making assessments under uncertainty. 
The impact of external reality on decisions is mediated by an actors' perceptions 
and misperceptions.  
In sum,  
the spiral model holds that statesman see hostility as indicating that 
the other is out to get them and believe that the best, if not the only 
way to cope with this threat is with negative sanctions. Decision-
makers sometimes believe that the other is acting out of insecurity 
or that real incompatibility, although significant, is limited. Even if 
they see the other as extremely hostile, decision-makers usually 
weight, however roughly and inadequately, the cost of responding 
with hostility, the gains of conciliation, and the possibility of 
compromise.58 
This theory is relevant to this case study because the response to an 
imbalance of power could fall into a state’s efforts to increase its security and this 
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could result in conflict. This is important because the “foreign policy behavior of 
states can be affected by the psychological process involved in individual 
judgment and decision making”59.  In this case study, the perceptions Colombia 
and Venezuela have of each other are driven by lessons of recent history on the 
use of force on border disputes. For this reason, the misperceptions of the 
capabilities and intentions of the adversary could provide the dynamics that 
might trigger a war.  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explained the basic theoretical framework of this thesis. The 
previous sections of this chapter raised the basic structure of the realist 
paradigm:  international politics is an anarchic, self-help realm. 
In this anarchic international environment, states are fearful of each other 
because any state is free to use force if it chooses. Security, thus, becomes the 
first priority. “This is because a state can never be certain that others’ intentions 
are benign; consequently its policies must be shaped in response to other’s 
capabilities.”60 Accordingly, states will try to preserve a balance of military 
capabilities, but the effort to restore a balance that was upset might produce a 
war. 
On the other hand, this chapter introduced the democratic peace theory as 
a causal variable to explain the maintenance of peace. Particularly in South 
America, Arie Kacowicz argues there is an absence of international wars, and 
says the effects of democratization and satisfaction with the status quo are the 
different explanations for the maintenance of peace in this region of the Western 
Hemisphere.  
Based on these theories, it is possible to infer some predictions for the 
case study.  
First, from the democratic peace theory point of view, the changes within 
the states (democracy) can transform the nature of international politics. In other 
                                            
59 Levy (2003). p. 19. 
60 Christopher Layne, Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, International 
Security, Vol. 19, N°2 (Autumn, 1994) p. 11. 
27 
words, the democratic peace theory holds that it is the very nature of democratic 
political system that accounts for the fact that democracies do not fight or 
threaten other democracies. Therefore, if the military implementation of Plan 
Colombia is creating an imbalance of power between Colombia and Venezuela, 
the affected country most probably will not make any kind of response due to the 
nature of the political regime. Put simply, Venezuela will ignore this imbalance in 
strategic military capabilities. 
The second is a realist perspective. “Realist takes the view that even if 
states change internally, the structure of the international political system 
remains the same.”61 Then, if there is an imbalance of power, the weaker state 
feels threatened and it will take actions to restore the balance. Consequently, if 
Colombia is gaining an advantage over Venezuela, the latter will react to an 
imbalance of power by trying to restore the balance. Hence, Venezuela’s 
response could fall into an internal effort (increase military capabilities) to 
reestablishing equilibrium. Internal efforts will be used because Venezuela has 
no external allies available. 
Moreover, these changing power balances and escalating military 
buildups will increase the security dilemma and could trigger a spiral model 
scenario that makes war more possible. As Robert Jervis explained, “when 
states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too 
little…unless the requirements for offense differ in kind and amount, a status quo 
power will desire a military posture that resembles that of an aggressor.”62 
Therefore, before it is possible to restore a balance of power, Colombia and 
Venezuela could undergo a dangerous period of instability. 
In order to understand the relation of these theories with the case study, 
the following chapter will study the background of the Colombian-Venezuelan 
dyad and how the balance of power has played a special role in their relations. 
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III. COLOMBIAN-VENEZUELAN DYAD 
A. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF COLOMBIAN AND VENEZUELAN 
DISPUTES 
Most of the litigations in Latin America have originated from historical 
causes, since most were inherited from the colonial period. “The initial division of 
the Spanish territory in Latin America and the lack of defined borders, as well as 
reiterated attempts undertaken in a climate of political instability during the 19th 
and 20th centuries, to expand one’s the own territory at the expense of the 
neighbor,"63 gave rise to many of the present territorial disputes. Venezuelan and 
Colombian relations are not excluded from these origins. The following 
paragraphs present a historical review of the relations between Colombia and 
Venezuela regarding border claims.  
The disparities in borders between Venezuela and Colombia have 
contributed to a fluctuating undercurrent of tension over the years. Three 
independent republics were created from the break-up of the Great Colombia in 
1830: Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. "A long process of border disputes 
between Colombia and Venezuela began from this event that have continued for 
more than two and a half centuries, and that has prevented the possibilities of 
improved relations."64 
The Venezuelan-Colombian borders were not clearly defined after the 
Independence Wars. Consequently, the disputes between these two nations 
became unavoidable. Colombia has always represented a military concern for 
Venezuela. The two countries dispute 34 points along their border, with the most 
serious being the Gulf of Venezuela. The roots of the boundary maritime issue 
stretch back to colonial times. 
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1. Principal Interstate Disputes between Colombia and Venezuela 
Four major incidents occurred between Colombia and Venezuela during 
the 20th century. At least one of the parties used some form of deterrence or 
military force based on these incidents. In 1881, both countries requested 
Spain’s King Alfonso XII’s arbitration over the conflicting claims. In 1891, 
Venezuela rejected the eventual 1891 arbitration decision because it disagreed 
on the location of Río de Oro’s source (Gold River). Fifty years later, both nations 
signed a treaty establishing the border along the Guajira Peninsula.  
a. Rio de Oro Incident, 1928 
In 1916, both countries agreed to request a second arbitration due 
to disagreements resulting from Spanish decision in 1891.  By 1928, when 
discussions about the boundaries of Rio de Oro  in both countries emerged 
during Venezuelan President Gomez’ regime, Colombia presented disputes that 
were intended to force Venezuela into signing the 1916 convention’s anticipated 
treaty. Additionally, Colombia wanted unrestricted access to navigate the Orinoco 
River. At the time, General Gomez responded with a military mobilization known 
as the “1928 Maracay Military Parade.”65 
 
 
Figure 1. Area of Rio de Oro Limit Discussion (1928) 
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 During this period, Colombia was a democracy under President 
Miguel Abadía Méndez and experienced severe economic problems. On the 
other hand, Venezuela was under Venezuela’s longest dictatorship of the 20th 
century (27 years).  In addition to being a dictatorship, General Juan Vicente 
Gomez paid all Venezuelan foreign debt and created a formal Armed Forces. In 
this incident, neither parity nor preponderance was significant due to the small 
military capabilities of both armies at that time. The factor that might be useful to 
consider is the disparity in regime type.  
b. Arauca Treaty Incident, 1941 
In 1941, Colombia located troops on the common border with 
Venezuela to press for an advantageous adjustment with respect to their claims. 
The pressure reached such proportions that Venezuelan President, Commander-
in-Chief Lopez Contreras, recognized that he acquiesced in the signing of this 
Treaty of 194166 because Venezuela "...was not prepared militarily to deal with a 
Colombian invasion.”67 Many Venezuelans, however, have criticized this 1941 
treaty for granting too much territory to Colombia. This attitude has hardened the 
stance of the armed forces with regard to the Gulf of Venezuela. It has also 
rendered more tentative the attempts of subsequent governments to negotiate 
the boundary in the gulf. Moreover, the development of oil resources in the area 
and the expectation of further expansion also raised the stakes involved in a 
potential resolution. 
Colombia in 1941 was a democratic regime led by President 
Eduardo Santos. He was experienced in the international arena due to his work 
in finding a solution to Peru’s hostilities in the Leticia War.  As a result of the 
military confrontation in the Leticia War, Colombia had better military capabilities. 
On the other hand, Venezuela had just recovered from 27 years of dictatorship 
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and had a president not elected by the people but appointed by the congress. 
Therefore, a pseudo-democracy describes Venezuela’s regime type. 
Consequently, this case has one democracy and a pseudo-
democracy where one had better military capabilities and used it to fulfill their 
aspirations. As expressed by Schwartz, Colombia adopted this attitude because 
they considered themselves strongest in military capabilities since they repelled a 
Peruvian invasion in 1932.68  
c. Admiral Padilla Incident, 1952 
In the 1950’s, new confrontations occurred. On January 23, 1952, 
the Colombian Department of State started a new claim where they stated that 
the Islands of Los Monjes (The Monks) in the Gulf of Venezuela belonged to 
Colombia. On February 26, the Venezuelan government declared sovereignty 
over the Los Monjes Islands by erecting a navigation light, and notified all 
navigators.69 
On September 1, 1952, the Colombian Navy Corvette ‘Admiral 
Padilla’ cast anchor, for two hours, in front of the northern island of Los Monjes 
and fired artillery rounds. According to Soto, this incident escalated to such a 
point that Venezuela’s Chiefs of Staff intensely discussed whether to authorize a 
Venezuelan Air Force fighter to fly over the area and sink the ‘Admiral Padilla’.70 
According to Schwartz,  
at that time Venezuela was in a better military capacity into than 
Colombia. Taking this into consideration, Venezuela accepted the 
challenge, and sent to the area troops in military ships, all of them 
being in combat readiness, plus airplanes with instructions to sink 
the ship, if it did not leave the Venezuelan waters in a specific 
time.71  
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This military posturing proved a sufficient deterrent, which resulted 
in the ‘Admiral Padilla’ leaving the area and conflict being avoided. 
On November 22, 1952 the Colombian Department of State by 
means of communication GM-542 exposed the Colombian government’s 
conclusions concerning the Archipelago of Los Monjes. Part of this 
communication stated that the Colombian government does not force any claims 
to sovereignty over any part of Venezuela or the archipelago in reference.72 This 
resolved the crisis without Venezuela having to make concessions. 
Colombia during this period of time was under immense internal 
pressure. The President in 1952 was Roberto Urdaneta who gained power due to 
a medical absence of President Laureano Gomez. Violence, guerrillas, and 
political instability were the major characteristics of this temporary regime that 
was becoming a dictatorship in Colombia. Venezuela experienced the last 
dictatorship of the 20th century. In terms of military capacity, the military junta in 
Caracas had increased the Venezuelan Armed Forces capabilities with the 
purchase of jet fighters and different types of tanks.  
In this particular incident, Venezuela had better military capabilities. 
However, it was the weaker state that engaged in provocative behavior. This 
correlates with Mares finding that “ten of the fourteen major crises (in Latin 
America) were initiated by weaker power refusing to back down in confrontations 
with preponderant rivals.”73 The regime type is an important factor to consider 
because the democratic status of Colombia is present but not under the formal 
president. However, it can be said that the Democracy-Dictatorship dyad is a 
possible argument to explain the militarized interstate dispute in this case 
because military governments are often seen as quick to utilize military force to 
resolve conflicts. Moreover, military regimes are believed to be authoritarian, not  
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only because the application of force is their profession but also, the existence of 
a controlling government means that force has been utilized against opponents 
at home. 
Others were provoked because of this incident. After an abortive 
effort in the early 1970’s and an inflexible refusal by Venezuela to submit the 
dispute to international arbitration, the two governments announced a draft treaty 
designated the Hypothesis of Caraballeda in 1981. The negotiators convened six 
formal sessions in the course of a year, the first in Medellín, Colombia in October 
1979 to the last in Caraballeda, Venezuela in October 1980, beginning a period 
of consultation. 
However, when President Luis Herrera Campins' foreign minister 
presented the draft to representatives of the Officer Corps of the Venezuelan 
military, he received an extremely negative reaction.  Some saw this proposal as 
giving Colombia some rights over a small portion of the Gulf of Venezuela, to 
allow the joint exploitation of border marine oil deposits. 
The details of these negotiations became public and were given 
prominent attention by the media. The Venezuelan public rejected the proposal 
positions as not being consistent with maintaining national pride. The proposal 
was brought to a national referendum, and opposition was so clamorous that the 
administration finally had to yield. In the process, many of the opposing voices 
raised the point that the previous treaties with Colombia were not valid, and the 
Foreign Ministry was accused of being antipatriotic.  
Regarding this event, a perception of attempted coercion by the 
Colombian Government to conclude negotiations arose when part of their military 
components made some movements along the borders with Venezuela. As 
commented by Area "...[I]n events well-known to all of us, in the heat of the 
discussion for the agreement on the hypothesis of limitation of marine and 
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submarine waters, Colombia made military movements as a form of pressure 
that immediately were responded to on the part of Venezuelan Armed Forces.”74  
One important aspect to be considered in this particular event is 
that both countries were well established democracies. The democratic 
experience of Venezuela and Colombia in this regard started earlier if compared 
with the rest of the countries in Latin America. Hence, the use of any type of 
coercion in this case is contrary to the norm as democracies tend to be more 
pacific or avoid the use of force.    
With the failure of Caraballeda, a period of boundary negotiations 
closed between both countries. In June 1985, Venezuelan President Jaime 
Lusinchi and Colombian President Belisario Betancourt re-opened negotiations in 
the declaration of Arauca. Here "... the intention that motivates both governments 
is to persevere in the efforts to solve, by means of right and equitable solutions, 
the relative subjects to the boundary of Marine and Submarine Areas.”75  
Between 1985 and 1987, an intense interchange of diplomatic 
notes took place between both countries. At the same time, public opinion in both 
countries maintained the intensity of diplomatic exchanges. This information 
vortex precipitated a progressive rise in the tone of diplomatic relations and 
public opinion "...[T]he Venezuelan Department of State observed with concern 
the unusual number of protest notes received from Colombia; twelve in that 
period...this with the evident intention to create a file that allowed Colombia to 
prove that the Venezuelan National Guard committed outrages against 
Colombian nationals.”76  
d. Caldas Incident, 1987 
Perhaps the highest level incident between the two nations 
happened in 1987 when the Colombian Armed Forces placed the Corvette 
Caldas in Venezuelan waters. This was not a navigation error. The Colombians 
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realized where the ship was and were trying to provoke Venezuela, so that the 
Colombian Government could execute political actions in different international 
circumstances. According to Olavarría, “the dangerous and irresponsible 
maneuver of provocation was destined to urge the spontaneous mediation and 
good faith of third states thus putting in evidence that the bilateral routes for the 





Figure 2. Area of Gulf of Venezuela 
 
The positioning of the Caldas Corvette and the diplomatic 
interchange between both countries precipitated the concentration, mobilization 
and deployments of Venezuelan military units, to the degree considered optimal 
to conduct battle operations if necessary as of August 18. In this interval, 
Venezuela organized the Command of Theater of Operations and deployed 
tanks, airplanes and frigates all along the wide western border.  Accordingly, part 
of the Infantry and the Artillery were mobilized. According to Soto, "there was a 
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great coherence between the strategy that arose from the initial perception and 
the political conduct of the crisis.”78 
On August 17, 1987, following the suggestion formulated by the 
Secretary General of the American Organization of States, Joao Baena Spares, 
and the President of Argentina, Raul Ricardo Alfonsin, the President of Colombia 
ordered the retirement of the Colombian ship for the sake of the de-escalation of 
the conflict between the two countries. “...Colombia, faithful to the principles of 
controversy resolution and consequent with its tradition of Latin American will, 
has ordered the pertinent measures to contribute to the normalization of the 
situation and trusts that the Government of Venezuela will do the same thing.”79  
Particularly important for this analysis is that during this event, both 
countries were under a democratic regime. Although both countries had similar 
military capabilities, Venezuela maintained a better equipped Air Force. 
Nevertheless, it was the weaker state that initiated the use of military force in this 
incident. Chapter IV will analyze the ‘Caldas’ incident in more detail. 
It is also necessary to evaluate the attacks to Venezuelan territory 
in the 1990’s. In this decade, eight attacks on Venezuelan border positions 
coming from Colombian insurgents occurred80, with lamentable losses of 
Venezuelan military personnel, from the Army as well as the National Guard.81 
For the Venezuelan State, this was seen as the repercussions due to the loss of 
Colombian central government authority in some areas of this domestic conflict. 
This situation stayed and reached its higher point in the 1990’s with 
the attack on the Venezuelan Marines’ post ‘Manuel Echeverrias’ on the border 
with Colombia, in Cararabo, Apure State. There, twelve Venezuelan soldiers 
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were killed in combat, which is remembered for the "viciousness and cold blood 
with which the insurgents massacred the Venezuelan marines."82  
In view of the insecurity along the Colombian-Venezuelan border, 
and due to Colombian irregular groups incursions, President Rafael Caldera 
activated Theater of Operations No 1 (T.O. No 1) in 1995 and Theater of 
Operations No 2 (T.O. No 2) in 1997; deactivating Task Group 1.1. The principal 
difference between them is the extension of the Area of Responsibilities (AOR) 
and the characterization of this new area of the border as a zone of conflict. 
Primarily, the mission of the Theater of Operations is “to carry out and conduct 
military and other operations in order to guarantee territorial integrity, sovereignty 
and national independence, combat and eradicate banditry, terrorism, drug 
dealing and smuggling, being also prepared to accomplish missions of 
conventional warfare in their areas of responsibilities.”83 
At the end of the 1990’s, a conflicting situation appears in relation 
to both countries. The elected president of Colombia, Andrés Pastrana Arango, 
presented a vision from the new government, concerning attempts at 
reconciliation within Colombia, with the aid of two programs that included a set of 
actions directed to restrain the causes of violence in Colombia, and to obtain the 
international endorsement necessary to advance a process of reconciliation with 
the rebel groups on 8 July 1998 for public opinion.84 
One of these programs is Plan Colombia. This program is 
generating new problem scenarios for Colombia’s neighboring countries. The 
Venezuelan case is one. As expressed by James Petras, 
Plan Colombia, a typical low intensity war (where large-scale U.S. 
financing and arms and low level ground troop commitment are 
combined), has already had a high intensity impact (on peasants 
and workers) which is internationalizing the conflict. Dozens of 
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suspected peasants, community activists, schoolteachers, and 
others have been assassinated, in order to terrorize the rest of the 
population. As Plan Colombia escalates the violence, thousands of 
peasants are fleeing across the borders into Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Panama, and Brazil. Inevitably cross border attacks by the 
paramilitaries on refugees has widened the military conflict. The 
frontier and borders have become war zones in which squatter 
refugees living in squalor are partisans in the conflict and are 
targets of the Colombian military. Rather than containing the civil 
conflict, Plan Colombia is extending and internationalizing the war, 
exacerbating instability in the adjoining regions of neighboring 
countries.85 
Besides the problem of a large number of Colombian refugees, the 
other problem is the military aspect. With the implementation of Plan Colombia in 
the border area, there is a great possibility of increased armed clashes with the 
Colombian insurgents and paramilitaries. As a matter of fact, this type of incident 
has already occurred when a series of coordinated land and air attacks by 
Venezuelan forces on Colombia territory were held in late December 2003 in hot 
pursuit of right-wing paramilitaries.86  
The initial “peace process” attempted during the last decade under 
the presidency of Andres Pastrana ended unsuccessfully, and explains why the 
Colombians elected Alvaro Uribe as Pastrana’s successor. The strategy of 
President Uribe, habitually referred to as a hardliner, is largely military. According 
to Mark Falcoff, “he regards the guerrilla problem as a police and security 
question and has proceeded accordingly.”87  
However, regionally, President Uribe has the perception that 
currently the Venezuelan government is not an ally in the war against insurgent 
groups. Relations between Caracas and Bogotá have been strained by 
Colombian suspicions that President Chávez’s regime provides safe haven and 
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material assistance to leftist guerrillas in the border region. An analysis of this 
situation was mentioned in World Press Review,  
 
The escalating war of words between the governments of 
Venezuela and Colombia over the deteriorating security conditions 
along their shared 1,375-mile border risks transforming Colombia’s 
civil war into an international conflict. Commentators on both sides 
of the border expressed mounting anxiety that the beleaguered 
Venezuelan regime of President Hugo Chávez would exploit the 
volatile security environment to distract attention from the domestic 
opposition’s campaign to force a recall referendum in August.88 
Under those circumstances, it is hard to expect a common ground 
for agreement in the unsolved territorial disputes. Moreover, interestingly enough 
is the presence of two democratic elected presidents and the preponderance of 
one in military capabilities also having international support from the region’s 
hegemon. 
The following section will analyze to what extent regime type is an 
essential factor to understand the militarized disputes between these two 
countries.  
B. REGIME TYPE AND COLOMBIAN-VENEZUELAN DYAD 
Venezuelans generally have tended to view Colombia as a violent and 
unstable country whose problems and people washed over the border into more 
peaceful and prosperous Venezuela. News of attacks on border posts, 
kidnappings of wealthy Venezuelan ranchers by Colombian guerrillas, and drug 
seizures during transshipment have reinforced this conception. However, 
incidents on territorial disputes had occurred during different time periods and 
regime type regardless of these perceptions or misperceptions.  
As presented in the previous section, the relationship between Colombia 
and Venezuela is generally tense, and tensions tend to rise and fall depending 
on the specifics of the issue at hand. Table 1 presents a summary of the main 
incidents in the Venezuelan-Colombian dyad. A common factor, in all these                                             
88 Robert, Taylor. Colombia-Venezuela Border Tension Rise. World Press Review at 
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cases, is the presence of territorial disputes. Also, in the incidents presented in 
Table 1, at least one country used some form of military force.  For example, in 
1952 and 1987, both countries sent military units to the area disputed (Gulf of 
Venezuela). 
Mares argues that “the prevalence of disputed territorial borders in the 
region means that the method of resolution of a particular conflict, whether 
diplomatic or military, takes on more general significance”.89 Hence, satisfaction 
with the territorial status quo is a necessary condition for the maintenance of 
peace between these two countries. Therefore, these incidents demonstrate that 
the use of military force is a method to acquire this satisfaction with the territorial 
status quo. 
 
Table 1.   Regime Type Vs Territorial Dispute Incidents 
 
Also, the presence of a specific regime type does not prevent the 
occurrence of interstate incidents. In other words, just because both countries 
are well established democracies does not mean that the use of military force as 
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Incident Regime Type Country Year Use of Military Force
Rio de Oro Democracy Colombia 1928 No 
Rio de Oro Dictatorship 
Military 
Venezuela 1928 Yes 
Arauca Treaty Democracy Colombia 1941 Yes 
Arauca Treaty “Transitional” 
Military 
Venezuela 1941 No 
Admiral Padilla Democracy Colombia 1952 Yes 
Admiral  Padilla Dictatorship 
Military 
Venezuela 1952 Yes 
Caldas Democracy Colombia 1987 Yes 
Caldas Democracy Venezuela 1987 Yes 
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a form of solution is not present. Perhaps the best example is the situation in 
1987 where both countries were considered well-established democracies. 
Actually, almost all possible combinations of regime type influence were 
present in Table 1, Democracy-Democracy (1941, 1987) and Democracy-
Dictatorship (1928, 1952). For Kacowicz, the South American case is a vivid 
example of how nondemocracies can establish and maintain peaceful relations 
among themselves and with democracies as well.90 Data in this case study do 
not support the hypothesis that domestic regimes make a difference in militarized 
disputes participation. For instance, the strongest evidence is that during the 
‘Caldas’ incident both countries were democracies for a long time and both used 
great scale military mobilization. 
Not enough numerical evidence exists to evaluate the role that the military 
balance of power has played in the relations of these two countries, because 
historical analysis of relative military power in Latin America is difficult using a 
quantitative methodology. Data on military budgets, arms expenditures, and 
imports are problematic until at least the 1970’s.91  
Nevertheless, the historical description of this chapter suggests that the 
balance of military power is important to understand the use of force in foreign 
policy. For example, in 1941, Venezuelan President Lopez Contreras signed the 
Treaty due to the pressure of Colombians troops on the common border. 
Colombia, during this time, also considered itself better prepared in military 
capabilities due to the confrontations with Peru during the Leticia War. 
One other aspect to consider in this analysis is the consequences of the 
misperception of international incidents or conflicts. When the 1952 Admiral 
Padilla incident occurred, Colombia was under immense internal pressure, with a 
someone leading the government not elected by the people. In contrast, 
Venezuela was under a military dictatorship that expanded the military 
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capabilities of their Armed Forces. Hence, the response of the Colombians can 
be considered as reflecting an assumption of hostile intentions coming from a 
neighboring country due to arms expenditures. Here, the misperception of 
adversary capabilities could have a major impact on the process leading to war.   
Consequently, as a form of analysis, three major issues can be 
considered in this case study. First, having no consensus or agreement in finding 
a solution for territorial disputes is, fundamentally, what has driven all incidents 
between Colombia and Venezuela. 
Second, regime type is not a factor to be considered as catalytic for the 
use of force in every incident. Besides, the most important military mobilizations 
occurred during democratic regimes. Additionally, an external factor, such as the 
Cold War, does not appear to influence these events as both countries were 
allies with the United States against communism during the last incidents. 
Some scholars argue “that the U.S. has managed inter-state relations, 
particularly conflict, in Latin America.”92 According to Mares: 
The arguments for U.S. determinism follow the logic that either 
conflict erupts when the U.S. fails to patrol the region or that U.S. 
policy actually stimulates conflict. The latter hypothesis, that the 
U.S. “mismanages” conflict, takes two forms: that the U.S 
stimulates conflict either because of U.S. opposition to nationalism, 
or to communism…Force is used when the U.S wants it, and also 
when the U.S opposes its use. The strongest evidence exists for 
the anti-communism argument. Indeed, the period of the Cold War 
sees increase of military conflict in the region.93 
Third, as described in this section, military force was used as a bargaining 
tool in diplomacy. As explained by Snyder: “…the function of military forces 
themselves may be shifting in the direction of a demonstrative role: the signaling 
of future intentions to use force in order to influence the enemy’s intentions, as 
opposed to being ready to use, or using, force simply as a physical means of 
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conquest or denial.”94 The use of this element, under different regime types and 
situations, is essential to understanding the perception that policy makers have to 
increase or use military power.  
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explained the roots of tension in the Venezuelan-Colombian 
dyad. In summary, this resulted because the borders of the nations that emerged 
from the wars for independence were not clearly defined. The disparities 
between Venezuela and Colombia, however, have contributed to a fluctuating 
undercurrent of tension over the years. The most visible irritant in the relationship 
is the dispute over the boundary demarcation in the Gulf of Venezuela. Hence, 
the unsolved territorial demarcation still plays an important role in the relations of 
these two South American countries. 
Also, this chapter compared regime type (democracy-dictatorship) and 
four different territorial incidents between the two countries. The historical 
relationship between Colombia and Venezuela has shown that during the 20th 
century, the presence of autocracy or dictatorship is not a good explanation for 
the cause of using military force.  Although theorists argue that well-established 
democracies do not fight each other since they are conservative powers, this 
case has demonstrated that these two democracies were close to engaging in a 
conventional war (1987), because they were not satisfied with their territorial 
status quo within and across their borders.   
In addition, this chapter presented some of the problems from which the 
Venezuelan State started to suffer, due to the implementation of some programs 
from the Colombian State during the President Pastrana administration. The next 
sections of this thesis introduce these problems. This is a diagnosis of Plan 
Colombia. How was it originated? What are its main purposes and how does it 
affect the balance of power between the two nations? 
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In order to do so, the next chapter will present different aspects of the Plan 
Colombia. What was the military balance of power between these two nations 
before and after the implementation of Plan Colombia? Here, the central 
emphasis is to explain how the military sector represents the major percentage of 
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IV. U.S. POLICY IN THE REGION: IMPLICATIONS OF PLAN 
COLOMBIA 
A. PLAN COLOMBIA: HISTORICAL REVIEW 
The United States government has in recent decades shown increasing 
preoccupation with ways to curb the drug supply from South America and 
particularly from Colombia, calling it a serious national security problem for the 
United States much as Communist expansion had been similarly described in the 
1960’s. 
That 80 to 90 percent of the cocaine and a growing share of the heroin 
consumed in the United States came from one country necessarily placed the 
narcotics issue at the top of the bilateral agenda, between Colombia and the 
United States. Consequently, one of the ways to decrease the supply was to 
engage in programs for eradicating the source of the drugs. Throughout the 
Clinton years, a group of drug war hawks in the U.S. Congress had pushed the 
administration to do more in Colombia.  
However, the initial thrust to eliminate this problem seems to have 
originated domestically in Colombia. On 8 June 1998, then candidate Andres 
Pastrana first proposed it during a campaign rally. He stated then that:  
[D]rug trafficking, more than a judicial problem, is a social 
problem…Developed countries must help us execute a kind of 
Marshall Plan for Colombia, that will allow us to undertake large 
investments in the social, agricultural and infrastructure field, to 
offer our peasants different alternatives apart from illicit crops.95 
President Pastrana claimed that social injustice was the breeding ground 
for instability, and that large foreign aid packages oriented towards social 
infrastructure would be a key element of his strategy to bolster political stability. 
Soon after the beginning of his government in August 1998, his administration 
began peace talks with the FARC guerrillas, during which government and rebel 
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envoys discussed the latter’s possible role as administrator of a U.S. financed 
drug eradication campaign by which peasants in southern Colombia, an area of 
intense guerrilla activity, would be paid to switch to legal crops.96 
During Pastrana’s first state visit to Washington in October 1998, 
President Clinton announced an increase in military aid to Colombia and pledged 
to mobilize U.S. and international support for the peace process. By August 
1999, Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering offered a substantial increase 
in U.S. aid if Colombia could create a comprehensive anti-drug strategy.97 
The Colombian government responded with an initiative dubbed Plan 
Colombia, unveiled formally in September 1999, which proposed expenditures of 
$7.5 billion. Colombia would contribute $4 billion and would hope to raise, in the 
next months, with international solidarity, the other $3.5 billion. The Colombian 
government defines Plan Columbia as an integral policy that looks to reiterate the 
commitment that the Colombian government has to look for a negotiated political 
solution to the conflict, under fundamental basic principles such as democracy, 
territorial integrity and the defense and protection of human rights.98 
During the following year, the Clinton administration struggled to obtain 
congressional approval for the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia.  President 
Clinton justified US economic support to Colombia in March 2000 with the 
following words:  
… [T]oday we are called upon to stand for democracy under attack 
in Colombia. Drug trafficking, civil conflict, economic stagnation, 
combine everywhere they exist, and explosively in Colombia, to 
feed violence, undercut honest enterprise in favor of corruption, and 
undermine public confidence in democracy. Colombia's drug 
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traffickers directly threaten America's security. But first, they 
threaten Colombia's future.99 
 Plan Colombia was defined as a “comprehensive plan to seek peace, 
fight drugs, build the economy, and deepen democracy.”100 In August 2000, 
during a visit to Colombia, Clinton claimed that the Plan’s objective was to 
achieve a better life for the people, for which it included a ten-fold increase in 
U.S. support for economic development, governance, judicial reform and human 
rights. It also offered human rights training for the Armed Forces and the National 
Police, while denying assistance to any military unit linked to human rights 
abuses.101 
During its discussion in Washington, it soon became clear that Plan 
Colombia’s initial emphasis on social investment had changed. Clinton asked the 
U.S. Congress for $1.6 billion in Colombian aid over two years, eventually 
obtaining authorization for $1.3 billion. While Colombia still pledged to finance 
most of the social aspects of the Plan through its own funds, the vast majority of 
U.S. resources were approved for military aspects of the anti-drug campaign.102 
In November 2000, US. Drug Czar Gen. Barry McCaffrey defended this 
new orientation affirming that security was one of the main challenges faced by 
Colombia, a situation which demanded strong military assistance from the United 
States to help the government regain legal control over the drug producing 
regions, particularly in the distant southern jungle region, in order to protect 
Colombian citizens and curtail illegal drugs production. In his description of the 
Plan, McCaffrey assured that it would work along two strategies. The first one 
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would be the eradication of drug production in Southern Colombia, followed by 
village-level programs to support the local economy’s transition to legal 
alternatives. 
These programs included the development of the necessary infrastructure 
for marketing legal crops as well as technical assistance for peasant 
organizations. Concerning the military component of the Plan, McCaffrey assured 
that their government’s policy was to abstain from directly supporting Colombian 
counterinsurgency efforts, focusing instead on anti-drug operations. However, 
the United States would provide support to the Colombian government to protect 
security forces directly related to anti-narcotics efforts.103 
On paper, the plan seemed to provide all of the necessary elements 
needed to solve Colombia's economic crisis and to end the violence. When 
looking at the actual aid package offered by the United States, however, it 
became evident that it was severely unbalanced, with the majority of the funding, 
or 80% of the total aid package, granted to the Colombian military and police. 
The remainder of the aid package would be distributed as follows: 8% for social 
development programs, 6% for human rights programs, 4% for aid to the 
displaced, 2% for judicial reform, and 0.5% for supporting the ongoing peace 
process.104 According to this data, the component that prevails is the one 
denominated cooperation in security and justice, which focused mainly on the 
fight against drug trafficking, by fortifying police and military forces. 
B. U.S. MILITARY AID UNDER PLAN COLOMBIA  
Some authors argue that Plan Colombia is essentially a U.S. authored and 
promoted policy directed toward militarily elimination of the guerrilla forces in 
Colombia. As presented by James Petras, U.S. policymakers describe Plan 
Colombia as an effort to eradicate drug production and trade by attacking the 
sources of production located in areas of guerrilla influence or control. Since the 
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guerrillas are associated with the coca producing regions, this line of argument 
proceeds, Washington has directed its military advisory teams and military aid to 
destroying what they call the "narco guerrillas”.105 
Guerrilla movements have been active in Colombia since the early 1960’s, 
with 1960 having been a particularly hard year. Ever since the late 1940’s, 
Colombia has been living with La Violencia.106 Today, the Revolutionary Armed 
Force of Colombia (FARC) deploys a military force numbering close to 18,000 
armed guerrillas active in most of the rural areas of Colombia. In Colombia, the 
combined guerrilla forces control or influence a wide strip of territory south of 
Bogotá toward the Ecuadorian border, northwest toward Panama and in several 
pockets to the east and west of the capital, in addition to urban militia units.  
The central premise of the U.S. component of Plan Colombia is that 
money from the trade in illegal drugs, called narcotrafficking, feeds the funds of 
the guerrillas, whose attacks give rise to citizen self-defense organizations - the 
paramilitaries. If it were possible to stop or drastically reduce the narco funds,  
the guerrillas could not mount their ambitious military campaigns against the 
state, and society would not be as  threatened. 
All these insurgents and paramilitary activities  damaged the Colombian 
military. The Colombian government tried to control the guerrillas’ powerful force 
using its own military, but the situation is uncontrollable when “drugs became the 
gasoline fueling the war in Colombia”.107 The defeats suffered by Colombian 
military forces in 1997 and 1998 convinced the government of the need to 
strengthen and modernize the military.108 Having been defeated several times, 
the Colombian government concluded that it was necessary to restructure the 
armed forces.      
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Beyond the development of a comprehensive national security strategy, 
the Colombian government needed to develop adequate instrumentalities to 
implement its strategy, especially a capable military force. Restructuring the 
Colombian Armed Forces needed strong economic support. That support came 
from the United States, which helped to develop a plan for “professionalizing the 
armed forces in Colombia and increasing their number to 452,000 by 2001 from 
the level of 12,000 that existed formerly.”109 
As of 2002, the Colombian Army is bigger currently composed of 52,000 
professional soldiers out of nearly 117,000, with perhaps 35,000 available for 
combat110, more aggressive and better led, organized, trained, motivated, and 
equipped. This is important because professional soldiers use technological 
sophistication as a method to replace brute force, and this is the key to victory.111  
An example of the Colombian military restructuring is the creation of the Rapid 
Deployment Force (Fuerza Rápida de Despliegue). This unit conducted 
important operations in 2001, including “Gato Negro” which captured the 
notorious Brazilian drug lord Fernandinho, who was trading money and arms for 
cocaine with the FARC.112  
With the help of U.S. military aid, the Colombian military machine is 
making strides unseen in their history. As a result of this support, the Colombian 
Armed Forces are now superior in comparison with some of their neighbors in 
troops and mobility of personnel. As stated by Marcella in her work, The 
U.S.Engagement with Colombia: Legitimated Authority and Human Rights:  
The top quantitative and qualitative requirements for any military 
organization are leadership, tactical mobility, intelligence, and 
quality of the troops. These must be complemented by logistical 
support, quick reaction, aggressive small unit operations, and 
cooperative relations with the civilian population. The Colombian 
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Army’s new aggressiveness takes advantage of improved mobility 
(going from 18 combat helicopters in 1998 to nearly 95 by the end 
of 2001) and battle-experienced field commanders. 
The bulk of the military assistance supports three counter-narcotics 
battalions tof he Colombian armed forces, which are to receive 16 UH-60 Black 
Hawk and 30 UH-1H Huey transport helicopters.113 Basically, the Department of 
Defense training focuses on Colombian Army pilots, crew chiefs, and 
maintenance personnel in airmobile operations. Night vision training and 
advance or readiness level progression training will enhance the capabilities of 
survivability of these helicopters in infiltration of Colombian ground forces during 
counter terrorist or counter narcotics operations. In addition, training and logistics 
programs are on track to provide greatly enhanced air mobility capability to the 
Colombian Army.114    
In sum, the Department of Defense, through the United States Southern 
Command, is training and equipping Counter Narcotics (CN) Brigades and 
riverine units, fielding Black Hawk helicopters, training pilots and crews, assisting 
with infrastructure upgrades, and providing counter drug intelligence support. 
They also continue to be responsible for military training and support missions.     
Additionally impressive is the amount of money the Colombian 
government is spending in the military sector. According to the last report 
published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), the 
world’s military expenses are on their way to levels matching those of the Cold 
War. The United States represents 43% of the total world-wide defense 
expenditures and continues to grow. The exceptions to this tendency, according 
to Sipri’s report, are: Venezuela, Argentina, Guatemala and Macedonia; the four 
nations that have undergone the most serious reductions in their military 
expenses worldwide.115 
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As matter of fact, the growth of the Colombian arsenal does not have any 
precedent in Latin America, particularly if one observes the factors required to 
have a modern military institution within the context of modern military doctrine: 
leadership, tactical mobility, intelligence and quality of the troops through training.  
Colombia’s military expenditures (ME) rose at an average rate of over 5 % 
(7.2% growth rate between 1995 and 1999), with a ratio of 3.2% ME/GNP. 
Venezuela was the only country whose military expenditures did not grow over 
the same period of time. Moreover, Venezuela only has a 1.4% ratio of 
ME/GNP.116 
Moreover, Plan Colombia, the third largest U.S. military aid program in the 
world, does not reflect the intricate and complex operations of the entire general 
military aid program that flows to Colombia from the United States. 
Especially, it is necessary to add the intangible part of Plan Colombia, 
those singular factors such as the transference of know-how originating from the 
state of the art military organization with the best technology and military 
intelligence of the world. Furthermore, with Plan Colombia, U.S. military advisors 
are teaching and directing high tech warfare, and providing operational 
leadership in close proximity to the battlefield. 
Training and a considerable number of arms and defense systems from 
the United States are transforming the Colombian Armed Forces into a very 
effective military machine in the region.  According to Angel Rabasa and Peter 
Chalk, among the most significant changes in this transformation are first, a new 
vision of operation, with emphasis on mobility and rapid reaction, improvement of 
the collection and processing of information, and development of an integrated 
communications system. 
Second, the development of a rapid deployment capability is transforming 
Colombian Armed Forces operations. The Colombian military now has a striking 
force of some 4,000, all professional soldiers who can be deployed anywhere in 
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the country. Third, in addition to better integrated operations with the land forces, 
the Colombian Air Force is now able to conduct night operations using night-
vision equipment. Fourth is the improvement in intelligence collection. Better 
training and equipment has provided the Colombian military with improved 
signals intelligence (SIGINT).117 To put it briefly, the new doctrine emphasizes 
mobility and presents a shift from a defensive to an offensive posture. 
C. BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA 
Relations between Colombia and Venezuela are generally tense, with 
tensions tending to rise and fall depending on the specifics of the issue at hand. 
The territorial dispute between Colombia and Venezuela is centered on 
control over the entrance to the Gulf of Venezuela. The Gulf of Venezuela 
dispute is a good example of a territorial dispute that becomes far more serious 
when a valuable resource, in this case oil, is involved. The key to establishing 
control of the disputed territories is ownership of the Los Monjes Islands, a chain 
of three tiny islands lying at the gulf's northern mouth. At stake in the dispute is 
control over a substantial amount of maritime territory in the Caribbean that 
extends into the gulf, an area popularly referred to by Colombians as the 
Coquibacoa Gulf. 
By gaining recognition for its claim to the islands, which are said to be all 
but submerged at high tide, Colombia could expand national territory into the 
Caribbean by declaring the extension of its 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone around the islands. It would also be able to claim a portion of the waters of 
the gulf, located next to Venezuela's oil-rich Lago de Maracaibo, which, 
according to estimates of possible reserves, might contain as much as 10 billion 
barrels of oil.118  
Although Colombia recognized Venezuelan sovereignty over Los Monjes 
in 1856, in 1934, under the liberal government of Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, 
Colombia claimed Los Monjes under their jurisdiction. Why did Colombia adopt 
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this attitude? The answer is, according to some authors, that they considered 
themselves strong in the military arena. In September 1932, Colombia repelled a 
Peruvian invasion under the command of Colonel Oscar Ordoñez in the Amazon 
(Puerto de Leticia).119 
The two countries conducted several unsuccessful rounds of negotiations 
during the 1970’s and 1980’s.  However, a group of some 400 Venezuelan 
military officers publicly warned officials in Caracas not to make concessions to 
the Colombians; given the past history of Venezuelan military politics, this 
“warning” was taken seriously by the Venezuelan government, and the possible 
settlement was postponed.120  
In August 1987, Colombian warships, including the missile frigate Caldas, 
entered disputed waters at the mouth of the gulf. Colombian Mirage fighters 
reportedly conducted over flights of the area and Venezuelan F-16 fighters were 
moved to a nearby air base and conducted several flights over the Colombian 
missile frigate. Open hostilities appeared imminent. Even after the withdrawal of 
the Colombian vessels by order of President Virgilio Barco Vargas, the armed 
forces of both nations remained on alert in the border area. The Venezuelan 
government maintained that the vessels' presence in the gulf for three full days 
represented an act of "intentional provocation" and sent a "strongly worded" 
formal protest to the Colombian president.121 
The “Caldas Incident” had military implications for both sides. The military 
potential of Colombia and Venezuela, compared with other Andean countries, is 
high. During this skirmish both countries tested their military capabilities and 
discovered their weaknesses in the strategic and operational environment. As 
explained by Child: 
The military implications of the dispute stem from the fact that both 
countries have middle size military establishments that are 
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respectable in regional terms. Both countries also have other 
disputes that make their own military demands and create the 
possibility of linkages between otherwise unrelated conflicts.122  
Colombia has territorial disputes with Nicaragua over a series of 
Caribbean islands, cays and banks, and Venezuela has a territorial reclamation 
dispute with Guyana over “The Esequibo”, a territory representing almost two-
thirds of Guyana’s territory. What exactly is the size of the military component of 
these two countries? Has the military strength of these two countries changed 
considerably after the last skirmish? 
1. Military Capabilities 
During the “Caldas Incident,” Venezuelan and Colombian units were at the 
same military level. The Navy and Air Force of these two countries had almost 
the same capabilities (See Table 1). The only advantage the Colombian Armed 
Forces had in comparison to Venezuela is that Colombian ground forces are 
highly trained because of continued engagements with guerrilla groups123. 
 The 1989 total strength of the National Armed Forces in Venezuela 
(Fuerzas Armadas Nacionales-FAN) was estimated at 69,000, broken down into 
34,000 army personnel, 10,000 navy, 5,000 air force, and 20,000 Armed Forces 
of Cooperation (Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación-FAC), also known as the 
National Guard.124 The 1988 Colombia total strength was estimated at 86,300: 
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Table 2.   Colombian-Venezuelan Military Capabilities During “Caldas” 
Incident (From: Jane’s 28 July 2003 and Jane’s Fighting Ships 1987-1988) 
 
Capabilities Colombia Venezuela  
Personnel In 1988, total strength estimated at 
86,300: army (69,000) navy (10,600), 
and air force (6,700). 
In 1990 total strength of the National 
Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas 
Nacionales--FAN) estimated at 69,000, 
broken down into 34,000 army 
personnel, 10,000 navy, 5,000 air force, 
and 20,000 Armed Forces of 
Cooperation (Fuerzas Armadas de 
Cooperación--FAC)--also known as the 
National Guard. 
Equipment Ground forces upgraded equipment in 
the 1980’s with the purchase of tube-
launched, optically tracked, wire-
guided (TOW) antitank weapons and 
armored vehicles; other armored 
equipment mostly of World War II 
vintage. Major naval vessels included 
four submarines, four frigates, four 
large patrol ships, two fast attack craft, 
three river gunboats, two coastal 
patrol vessels, and eight river patrol 
craft. Air force equipment included jet 
fighters; antiaircraft missiles; and 
various ground attack aircraft. 
Armor and artillery assets somewhat 
antiquated. Major naval vessels--
including British-built "Constitution"-
class fast attack craft, Italian "Lupo" 
missile frigates, and German Type 209 
submarines--purchased during the 
1970’s. Air Force equipped with most 
modern weaponry, including United 
States F-16 and French Mirage fighters. 





Colombia 165,800 300 46 8 
Venezuela 79,000 601 73 8 
Notes: 
1. Not including reserves. 
2. Includes army and navy aviation, but not helicopters or combat-capable trainers. 















Colombia 4 4 4 2 10 3 5 
Venezuela 3 8 7 6 65 0 3 
 
The Venezuelan Air Force (VAF) equipment represented Colombia’s 
primary concern in air superiority. The VAF is a highly professional force that 
avails itself of the finest military equipment the United States and France has to 
offer. However, ground and sea forces strength during the time period covered 
was balanced. 
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According to Mares, after the “Caldas Incident” Colombia “dramatically 
increased the size of the armed forces, partly due to increased guerrilla activity, 
but also stimulated by Congressional concerns that during the crisis Venezuela’s 
superior military standing put Colombia to disadvantage”.125 This alarm was 
reflected in the purchase of 13 K-fir fighters from Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) 
and 4 missile frigates.126 This resulted in a more equal military balance of power 
between the two countries.  
Although Mares suggested that “the distribution of overall military power is 
not a major factor in Latin America’s violent peace” the figures in this case study 
indicate the contrary. The Colombian government, after testing Venezuelan 
military capabilities, applied a realist approach. A “realist world is a world in which 
the use of military force cannot be eliminated, and at best is deterred by superior 
force.”127 It seems that Colombian policy was driven by security concerns. That 
being the case, security in this relation leads to concern with the balance of 
military power. However, even with this increase in military capabilities, Colombia 
had not overcome its internal violence. During the late 1980’s, the increased 
threat to Colombia’s national security posed by renewed guerrilla activities and 
the growing power of Colombian narcotics traffickers, provided the rationale for 
considerable increases in military expenditures (Table 3). 
Table 3.   Defense Expenditure (From: The Military Balance 2002-2003. The 
international Institute for Strategic Studies) 
 
 US $m Number in Armed 
Forces 
Reservist Paramilitary
 1985 2001 2002 1985 2002 2002 2002 
Colombia 823 2,839 2,840 66.2 158.0 60.7 104.6 
Venezuela 1,855 1,881 1,081 49.0 82.3 8.0 23.0 
 
As expressed previously in this chapter, during the 1990’s, several military 
defeats led the Colombian government to reform its armed forces. In order to 
make these reforms, Colombia needed economic support: they needed a plan. 
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With the help of the United States, the Colombian government implemented 
“Plan Colombia”. The execution of this plan is creating new scenarios that affect 
regional stability. How did the implementation of this plan change the military 
balance of power between Colombia and Venezuela? 
D. BALANCE OF POWER BETEWEEN COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA 
AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN COLOMBIA 
Colombian Military Forces are represented by three traditional branches: 
Army, Navy and Aviation. It is necessary to add the  National Police to all three 
branches, which is part of the Ministry of the Defense, but separated into two 
main blocks: Colombian Military Forces (FMC) and Police Armed Forces (FAP). 
The operative arm of the Ministry of the Defense structure has exerted a 
constant fight against the drug cartels that traditionally have operated in 
Colombia. Similarly, they constantly confront the Colombian guerrilla (FARC, 
ELN, ELP) and other paramilitary groups that at the moment challenge the 
Colombian government. 
Before the implementation of Plan Colombia, “infantry weapons and 
ammunitions were in ample supply, but shortages of crew-served pieces and 
communications gear remained severe. Transportation of all sorts, whether 
trucks or helicopters, was all but absent.”128 
According to an American military instructor familiar with both countries, 
from an operational and logistical point of view  
the Colombian problem was very similar to the Venezuelan but 
probably worse. They couldn’t move, they couldn’t talk with each 
other, they couldn’t shoot, they had no intelligence and they had no 
logistical support. In sum they could not support themselves in the 
field.129  
During the government of President Andrés Pastrana, with regard to Plan 
Colombia, an equipment reconstruction, training and psychological recovery of 
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the Military Forces began. All these implied better conditions in case of 
counterinsurgency fights and any time when facing a case scenario of conflict. 
The U.S. Research Service summarized the growth of U.S. assistance, 
U.S. assistance to Colombia, virtually all of it related to 
counternarcotics efforts, has increased steadily since FY1995. The 
United States has provided equipment, supplies, and other aid for 
the counternarcotics efforts, initially largely to the Colombian 
National Police (CNP), but recently increasingly to the Colombian 
military. As of FY2000, more is being provided to the military.130  
According to Cynthia Arnson, the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia 
became defined by its largest component: military assistance. Some  80% of the 
$1.6 billion package unveiled in January 2000 was for military and police 
purposes, including the purchase of 63 Blackhawk and Huey helicopters, the 
training of special army anti-narcotics battalions, and other support for drug 
interdiction and eradication efforts.131 
The scope of U.S. assistance to the Colombian government under Plan 
Colombia widened in 2002. Aid previously granted for counter-narcotics 
operations will now include security assistance to enable the government to 
combat illegal armed groups. 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has been a major source of 
funding and support for Colombian counternarcotics efforts, mainly through 
programs not considered “traditional foreign aid” programs.132 The spectrum of 
military aid, from the Department of Defense to Colombia, after the 
implementation of this plan is broad. Among them are:  
DOD provides support for efforts to detect and monitor illicit 
narcotics operations, principally the maintenance of five radar sites 
in Colombia. DOD also conducts surveillance overflights from 
locations outside Colombia. During 1999, DOD helped establish, 
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train and equip the first special Colombian Army counternarcotics 
battalion (CACB) of some 950 troops, which commenced 
operations towards the end of that year. The battalion was set up to 
conduct its own CN missions, as well as to provide security for the 
police counternarcotics forces in their operations. DOD also 
sponsors a riverine CN program, training personnel of the 
Colombian Navy and Marines to control narcotics trafficking along 
Colombia’s extensive network of rivers.133 
The greatest assistance to the Colombian Army and Police Forces is in 
the development of a rapid deployment capability (counternarcotics battalions) 
and air mobility (helicopters). The three counternarcotics battalions established 
with U.S. assistance provide assistance for the army.  The special 
counternarcotics unit provides assistance to the police.  
The total package of Plan Colombia helicopter assistance for counter 
drugs operations was renegotiated after legislation was passed on July 18, 2000 
during the Clinton administration. As a result, Colombia received in total under 
Plan Colombia funding 33 UH-1Ns, 30 Huey IIs, and 16 UH-60s (Blackhawks). 
Of these, all 33 UH -1Ns have been delivered to the Colombian Army, 18 in 
October 2000, and 15 on February 2, 2001. Of the UH-60s, 14 will be provided to 
the army and two to the police. All weaponry has been delivered to the Army 
counternarcotics battalions (i.e., 120 M-60 machine guns, 36 M-24 sniper rifles, 
12 Mark-19 automatic grenade launchers, and 24 60 mm mortars).134  
In order to reinforce this military aid, on April 9, 2001, the Bush 
Administration requested $731 million in FY2002 funding for a broader regional 
strategy called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) that would include 
funding from the International Narcotics Control account (INC) for not only 
Colombia, but also Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela 
(Table 3). For Colombia, the Bush Administration request for FY2002 provided 
continued support for Plan Colombia legislation programs. The $399 million 
requested for Colombia includes $252.5 million for counternarcotics and security 
programs. 
                                            
133 Serafino, p. 2. 
134 Serafino, p. 21. 
63 
The $252.5 million for counternarcotics and security programs in Colombia 
includes $87.5 million for support to the Colombian National Police, including 
funds for eradication, for aviation support, training, equipment and infrastructure, 
and for logistical support; $79.5 million to training, operational support, logistical 
support, and capital investment for the Army’s Huey II and UH-60 helicopters; 
$26.5 million to improve the infrastructure supporting counternarcotics 
operations, particularly for force protection purposes; $13.5 million for Colombian 
Army units involved in counternarcotics operations; $43.0 million in support for 
air, maritime, riverine, and ground interdiction; $2.5 million in program support.135  
 
Table 4.   President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) (From: 
Reference Sheet, 150 Account, provided by the Department of State, May 
14, 2001, quoted by Serafino. p. 23) 
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This assistance is increasing Colombia’s military capabilities 
exponentially. Additionally, according to this data (Table 3), funds from the 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative are directly supporting military programs not only 
used in counternarcotics operations but also in counterinsurgency operations.  
To summarize, since the mid-1990’s U.S. aid to Colombia’s security forces 
has grown as fast as a dot-com stock price. Totaling approximately $65 million in 
1996, assistance more than quadrupled by 1999 to just under $300 million and 
will reach about $3 billion in 2004. The Columbian State can deploy or use all this 
military apparatus for conventional military operations at any time. 
According to the Colombian National Department of Planning in their 2004 
report, with Plan Colombia military implementation, military forces incremented 
their capacity in helicopter 78% and  in aircraft 18% (Figure 3 ). It represents a 
















Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense, 2003
 
Figure 3. Air Mobility Capacity in Colombia after Plan Colombia 
Implementation 
 
Particularly important is the air mobility capacity increment reached by the 
Army and the Police Forces (Figure 4). In the first case, the number of 
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helicopters jump from 23 to 94 and the number of aircraft from 2 to 12, which 
represent a total increase of 324%. In the case of the police, the change is from 
40 to 66 helicopters and from 16 to 23 aircraft, an increment of 59% in their air 
mobility capacity. Additionally, with national resources, the Army tactical 
































Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense, 2003  
Figure 4. Army and Police Air Mobility Capabilities after Plan Colombia 
 
As a result of this increase of air mobility capacity, Colombia is able to 
transport a considerable number of ground units. This 324% increment is 
significant if compared with only 26 helicopter units in Venezuela with an 
availability of 34% (Percentage of mission capability rate). Colombia maintains 
an average of 77% (Percentage of mission capability rate) with a total of 258 
helicopters. 
The centerpiece of U.S. aid to the Colombian Air Force in 1999 was a 
program to upgrade its fleet of Vietnam-era A-37 Dragonfly intercept aircraft. The 
                                            
136 Departamento Nacional de Planeación. Plan Colombia: Resultados 1999-2003. At 
http://www.soberania.info/Archivos/Plan_Colombia_resultados_1999_2.pdf [05 April 2004] 
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State and Defense Departments spent about $21 million on A-37 upgrades and 
pilot training in 1999. While additional money funds runways and other 
improvements at air force bases, particularly at Tres Esquinas, the new aid 
proposal would also upgrade Air Force OV-10 Bronco aircraft for air intercept 
missions. A comparison of air power capabilities between both countries, 
demonstrates that they possess almost the same combat capacity (Table 5). 
 
Table 5.   Combat Aviation (From: The Military Balance 2002-2003. The 
international Institute for Strategic Studies 
 
Combat Aviation (July 2000) 
Venezuelan Air Force Colombian Air Force 
Type Quantity Type Quantity 
F-16 22 KFIR 13 
MIRAGE 50 14 MIRAGE 11 
VF-5 10 A-37 14 
OV-10 10 OV-10 10 
AT-27 21 PUCARA 03 
  AC-47 04 
  AT-27 13 
TOTAL:77 Aircrafts TOTAL: 68 Aircraft 
 
However, this A-37 and OV-10 upgrade is especially important because 
these aircraft are not only used for COIN (counterinsurgency) operations but also 
for Air to Ground and Close Air Support (CAS) operations. In fact, these types of 
aircraft are mainly used to support ground units. Therefore, they can be 
employed at any moment in conventional warfare. Perhaps more important, is 
the average of availability these systems possess after this significant 
contribution. Additional assistance for FY 2004 “is to include C-130 transport 
aircraft and helicopters, as well as the recondition of AC-47 gunship.”137 
In summary, because of this economic support from the United States for 
counternarcotics and counterinsurgency operations, a significant increase in the 
development of military capabilities and infrastructure has taken place in the 
Colombian Armed Forces. 
                                            
137 The Military Balance 2002-2003. p. 176. 
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This led to the question, is Plan Colombia creating an imbalance in military 
power between Colombia and Venezuela?  Basically, the military balance is an 
assessment of the relative strengths of the two countries’ armed forces. In this 
case, the military implementation of Plan Colombia is creating an imbalance in 
some categories where the quantitative assessment of equipment has increased. 
So the answer is yes. The execution of Plan Colombia in its different phases has 
created a military imbalance between Colombia and Venezuela in areas such as 
Air Mobility, Air Interception, Close Air Support, Special Operation Units and Air 
Defense. 
What cannot be measured, but has a significant value, is the qualitative 
change in capabilities due to the U.S military aid to Plan Colombia. 
Quantitatively, it is possible to measure the assessment of personnel strength 
and equipment holdings but it is not possible to measure or evaluate the quality 
of units or equipment, nor the impact of doctrine, military technology, 
deployment, training, logistic support, tactical or strategic initiative. Or can we? 
All these previously cited aspects constitute part of the package the 
Colombian armed forces are receiving. The bulk of the equipment is helicopters 
and radars but the real value is the know how assistance. In other words, it is 
the way Colombian armed forces are using new capabilities in real combat 
situations. The doctrine in use is the U.S. experience in other COIN operations in 
Latin America. This is what practically makes a real difference if comparing both 
armed forces.  As expressed by Rabasa and Chalk, “clearly, not all of the 
lessons of the Salvadoran war of 20 years ago are applicable to Colombia today, 
but some experiences apply, particularly at the operational and tactical level”.138  
In fact, what constitutes a good factor to analyze in this comparison is the 
use of top intelligence collection. U. S. aid has provided the Colombian military 
with improved signals intelligence (SIGINT). Using this critical factor has 
guaranteed successful operations against guerrillas in 2003. In sum, 
considerable experience, equipment, and intelligence sharing counter-insurgent 
                                            
138 Angel, Rabasa and Peter Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth : The Synergy of Drugs and 
Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability. RAND. Santa Monica. 2001. p. 96. 
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and anti-drug roles have forged the Colombian Army, Air Force, Navy and 
National Police into a relatively professional and competent service, almost 
exclusively directed towards counter-guerrilla operations.    
In contrast, the Venezuelan armed forces have remained at almost the 
same levels of military strength. From 1950 to 1986, Venezuelan military 
spending as a percentage of gross domestic product averaged between 1.5 
percent and 2 percent. Since 1985 to 2003, Venezuela’s defense expenditure 
has decreased considerably if compared with Colombia (Table 3). 
However, Venezuela has completed some armament requests which have 
increased since 1998. These included some orders and deliveries from different 
countries such as: Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), radars (Flycatcher), and 
train/combat aircrafts (AMX-T).139 Perhaps the most significant of these requests 
are Venezuela’s intention to buy a new type of fighter and helicopters. Since 
2002, Venezuela has studied the purchase of MIG-29 and Mi helicopters from 
Russia. These intentions increased in 2004 after the Colombian government 
announced the purchase of 40 Spanish tanks. “The Russian news agency Tass 
is said to have reported that the talks between the two countries (Russia and 
Venezuela) resumed last month over the purchase of between 12 and 24 MIG-29 
fighters.”140 
In September 2003, President Uribe and Colombia’s Minister of Defense 
announced the process of modernization of Colombia’s Air Force. The Minister, 
Marta Lucia Ramirez expressed: “what we are looking for is that when this 
internal conflict is over the Colombian Air Force must be a dissuasive force 
against any external or internal threat in regard to air space and national 
sovereignty.”141 This scenario is not new between both nations.  
 
                                            
139 The Military Balance 2002-2003. p. 320. 
140 Magnus, McGrandle. Venezuelan Talks over Purchase of Russian MIG’s ‘ongoing’. The 
Daily Journal. Caracas. 4 April 2004. 
141 Sistema de Información de la Defensa Nacional de Colombia. Fuerza Aérea Traza 
Directrices en lucha contra el terrorismo. At http//:www.mindefensa.gov.co [16 April 2004] 
Translated by Omar Pina. 
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1. Present Trends and Prospects for the Future 
President Uribe has pledged to end the conflict with the guerrillas by the 
end of his term in 2006. As part of Uribe’s counter-insurgency campaign, the 
Colombian armed forces are being expanded from 147,000 to 200,000 
personnel. The rapid reaction force, Fuerza de Despliegue Rápida (FUDRA), has 
elevated their number to three mobile brigades and Special Forces brigades. 
Moreover, the Army will also incorporate two mobile brigades in addition to those 
FUDRA. The Army expects they will have three more mobile brigades added to 
the order of battle each year for the next three years. Meanwhile, the Colombian 
National Police have expanded by 16,000 to a total of 121,000 by the end of 
2003. 
The cross-border security situation between Colombia and Venezuela 
worsened with an increase in guerrilla movement and drug trafficking. FARC has 
executed a number of attacks both on the border and in Venezuela, leading to 
fears that the Colombian civil war could become an international conflict. With 
continued instability in Venezuela, and further attempts by opposition groups to 
oust President Hugo Chávez, there is a possibility that the threat or use of force 
will be present in the near future. 
According to Russett “the threat or use of force will be directed against 
states that a democracy perceives as politically unstable”. Russett argues that: 
If we expand the notion of political instability to include domestic 
political threat to the government because of its economic policy 
shortcomings, or competition in close election, this gives us a 
temporal context for the possible use of military force by 
democracies. It suggests that the ‘unstable’ state will initiate, or 
escalate, the use of force in a diplomatic dispute.142        
Under the present conditions, both countries can be then categorized as 
democratic, elected governments with internal instability. Therefore, a military 
interstate dispute is highly likely. According to some Venezuelan military officials, 
“there is a high percentage of probabilities of a military confrontation after the last 
                                            
142 Bruce, Russett. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for Post Cold World. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. p. 36. 
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phase of Plan Colombia basically because of three things: first there has been 
almost no progress on the limitation of marine and submarine waters 
discussions; second the strategic advantage that Colombian armed forces will 
have after this process with no internal threat; and third is the level of distrust of 
Colombians in Venezuela.”143  
Thus, this perception (or misperception?) of the hostility of the adversary’s 
intention is particularly important because, in the short term it can induce one to 
take counteractions (in the extreme case, a preemptive strike) that trigger a 
conflict spiral and unnecessary war, and in the long term it can lead to an arms 
race or system of alliances and counter-alliances.”144 
Additionally, Russett argues that there are possibilities of a military conflict 
between states where one or both state’s status as a democracy leaves some 
basis for doubt. “Perceptions of instability may also be based on a high degree of 
violent opposition to the democratic government: a democracy under siege of 
domestic terrorism, insurgency, or civil war is one in which the ostensible norms 
of peaceful conflict resolution simply are not working well.”145  
To summarize, this case study presents two countries with no territorial 
satisfaction and where the effects of democratization are constrained by internal 
problems: civil war or extreme political instability. That being the case, the 
Kacowicz explanation for maintenance of peace falls short in these case studies. 
As expressed by Kacowicz,  
It will be premature to characterize the Colombian-Venezuelan 
relations as a firmly institutionalized stable peace. In March 1995, 
following the cross-border attacks by Colombian guerrillas on 
Venezuelan soldiers posted at the frontier, both countries increased 
                                            
143 Interview between J. Linares, Colonel, Venezuelan Army, Venezuelan Ministry of 
Defense. Operations Chief of Staff. Fuerte Tiuna, Caracas., and the author, 02 April 2004 
144 Michael Sullivan, “Power in Contemporary Politics”, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 
Managing International Conflict (1990) p. 18. 
145 Russett (1993). p. 37. 
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their military presence along their common border, so that an 
armed conflagration between them still remains a possibility.146 
Consequently, the democratic peace theory is not the sine qua non policy 
for all western democracies. In this case study, both countries under a 
democratic regime have historically had military skirmishes. In view of the 
present situation, there are high probabilities of inter democratic conflict because 
unsolved territorial claims exists as well as an imbalance of military power. Also  
both countries experience political instability. For that reason, the democratic 
peace theory does not apply to this case study.  
Conversely, Venezuela’s actual response can be considered an internal 
effort. In other words, increments in military capabilities will be a method for the 
Venezuelan government to reestablish equilibrium. That equilibrium will create an 
environment to promote a more stable peace between both nations. This 
scenario corresponds with the theory that in Latin America, when power is 
equally distributed, states will be more likely to refrain from war. 
On the other hand, this effort will increase the security dilemma and could 
trigger a spiral model scenario that certainly makes war more possible. Actually, 
current perceptions of neighbor intentions in increasing military capabilities can 
be critical during the actual serious political situation that both countries are 
experiencing. 
 
E. CONCLUSION  
The democratic peace theory has been strongly criticized by realists on 
statistical grounds. Several studies have revealed several problems with this 
assertion. Some of these statistical analyses reveal that it is not clear that 
democracies do not fight one another.147 The case study presented in this 
chapter is a good example of that criticism. Here, the presence of military 
skirmishes between the two longest liberal democracies in Latin America does 
                                            
146 Arie Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World, South America and West Africa in 
Comparative Perspective, (1998) p. 87. 
147 John, Byrnes. The Myth of the Democratic Peace. In Political Paradigm: New Faces of 
Democracy. Fall 2002. p. 29. 
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not support the democratic peace theory. Hence, the expectation is that the 
imbalanced country will initiate some kind of response not taking into 
consideration the nature of the political regime. 
Also, as seen in this chapter, Plan Colombia has created an imbalance of 
military power in some areas between these two countries. The balance of power 
is important in the relations of some Latin America countries because there is 
less chance they will engage in a militarized interstate dispute if military parity 
exists among those states. Thus, if power theorists are correct, parity should 
mean both fewer wars and less violent militarization of disputes. In Mares words, 
“parity brings peace because neither side can reasonably sure of winning a war 
at acceptable cost.”148   
In this case, Venezuela’s response to the imbalance created has been a 
natural reaction to security concerns. That being the case, security in this relation 
is related to the balance of military power. Therefore, the military balance of 
power is important because it creates a more sustainable base to maintain peace 
between both countries. 
Venezuela’s response of increasing military capabilities to restore the 
balance is a natural solution of the weaker state that feels threatened and is 
taking actions to restore the balance. Consequently, this attitude corresponds to 
a realist approach. Hence, this attitude justifies the second hypotheses: 
Venezuela’s response could fall into an internal effort (increase military 
capabilities) to reestablish equilibrium or allies. 
However, a spiral model scenario is also present in this case study. 
Political instability, civil war and territorial disputes mixed with the presence of 
economical interests in both countries create an atmosphere of misperceptions of 
the adversary’s intentions concerning their military capabilities. This is related to 
the previous realist approach because military buildup can be considered as a 
preparation leading to war. Thus, in this case, perception of the other’s intentions  
                                            
148 Mares. (2001) p. 113. 
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plays a great role in the outcome of possible conflict. Thus, if the spiral model is 
correct, it will have a major impact under present conditions between these South 
American countries.  
It is difficult to assert which theory is correct. It is also difficult to infer 
which theory could predict the outcomes of the current situation. What can be 
said about this scenario is that Plan Colombia is likely to increase tension and 
instability in the long Colombian-Venezuelan dyad, because the military 
implementation of Plan Colombia broke military equilibrium and a clear 
perception of neighbor intentions with respect to new military capacities does not 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the research question: Is Plan 
Colombia creating an imbalance of military power in the region? Does it 
matter? The theoretical framework for balance of power and the explanation of 
peace in Latin America have already been discussed in detail in Chapter II. 
Consequently, this chapter will briefly summarize those arguments and analyze 
them with the case study. Also, this chapter presents the major findings of this 
research and evaluates the prospects for Colombian-Venezuelan relations.  
Finally, the chapter offers policy recommendations. 
A. BALANCE OF POWER AND ZONE OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE 
Chapter II explored the applicability of democratic peace and balance of 
power theory. Many scholars have tried to determine the factors that promote 
peace and stability. Realists believe that the external factors of power and the 
threat of force are the answer; while others propose there is a more complex 
solution involving the internal politics of a nation. Regime type has been the 
focus of this explanation. Some scholars argue that democracies almost never 
fight each other. Particularly in South America, Arie Kacowicz argues that the 
absence of international wars, the effects of democratization and satisfaction with 
the status quo, are the different explanations for the maintenance of peace in this 
region of the Western Hemisphere. 
On the other hand, power analysts disagree about whether parity or 
preponderance diminishes the likelihood of military conflict. Most of the time, the 
theoretical literature on the distribution of power and war examines the question 
from a systemic perspective. As a consequence, policymakers in Latin America 
often focus on the regional or bilateral distribution of power to explain military 
conflict. Consequently, if balance of power theorists are correct, parity should 
mean both fewer wars and less violent militarization of disputes. The reasoning is 
simple. Parity brings peace because neither side can be reasonably sure of 
winning a war at acceptable cost. According to Mares, the parity thesis finds 
strong support in the major crises in the last 26 years in Latin America.  Out of 
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fourteen disputes, only three involved parity and none escalated (Peru-Chile 
1976; Colombia-Venezuela 1986; Venezuela-Colombia 1993). Consequently, it 
appears that balance of power theories could explain Colombian-Venezuelan 
relations.  
B. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
Territorial disputes have been common in Latin America. Many of these 
disputes date back to the time of independence. This is the case between 
Colombia and Venezuela. The disparities between Venezuela and Colombia 
have contributed to a fluctuating undercurrent of tension over the years. The 
most visible irritant in the relationship is the dispute over the boundary 
demarcation in the Gulf of Venezuela. Hence, the unsolved territorial 
demarcation still plays an important role in the relations of these two South 
American countries. 
The historical relation between Colombia and Venezuela has shown that 
during the 20th century the presence of regime type is not a good explanation for 
the use of military force in Colombia-Venezuela skirmishes (Chapter III).  
Although theorists argue that well established democracies do not fight each 
other since they are conservative powers, this case has demonstrated that these 
two democracies were close to engaging in a conventional war (1987). 
Additionally, having no consensus or agreement in finding a solution for territorial 
disputes is fundamentally what has driven all incidents between Colombia and 
Venezuela. It is also important to mention that in this relationship, military force 
was used as a bargaining tool in diplomacy. 
C. RELEVANCE OF PLAN COLOMBIA IN THIS RELATIONSHIP 
Chapter IV explained the origins of Plan Colombia and the impact of the 
military aid from the United States on the Colombian Armed Forces. Both 
countries were in almost a military equilibrium during the development of the 
‘Caldas’ incident in 1987. Due to the increase of violence with insurgent groups, 
Colombia increased its levels of military expenditures. However, this did not 
significantly affect the military balance with Venezuela. The implementation of 
Plan Colombia in its different phases created a military imbalance between 
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Colombia and Venezuela in areas such as Air Mobility, Air Interception, Close Air 
Support, Special Operation Units and Air Defense. However, the knowledge 
gained from the Plan Colombia package is the main factor creates an imbalance 
in the military capabilities between these two countries. 
The review of Venezuela’s military expenditures suggests that there might 
be a perception of other possible uses of all the new equipment after Colombia 
completes the last stage of this program. News of Venezuela’s intentions to buy 
MIG 29’s and Colombia’s plans to buy tanks from Spain indicate that a spiral 
model is possible. Put in Jervis’s words, “when states seek the ability to defend 
themselves, they get too much and too little…unless the requirements for offense 
differ in kind and amount, a status quo power will desire a military posture that 
resembles that of an aggressor.”149 
The current situation between both countries is not moving in a favorable 
direction. During the first part of 2004, tension increased between both countries. 
According to some political opposition in Venezuela, the government is driving 
this country to a conflict as a response to the political instability. "Let Colombia 
know that Chavez is dragging us into a veiled fratricidal war to defend his 
illegitimate aim to stay in power."150 On the other hand, some of Colombia’s 
political figures indicated in 2004 that “President Uribe has as an objective to 
prepare a invasion to Venezuela with Colombia’s armed militias and the help of 
the United States using Plan Colombia.”151 
Consequently, it has become more likely that after the imbalance created 
by Plan Colombia, one of the countries will use military force or threats as a 
mode to resolve old border disputes as part of a solution for their domestic 
political process. 
 
                                            
149 Robert Jervis. “Perception and Misperception in International Politics”.  Princeton. 
Princeton University Press. (1976). p. 64.  
150 Diego, Urdaneta. US, Colombia 'Invasion' Of Venezuela Is Chavez Ploy: Opponents. 
Agence France-Presse.  13 May 2004. 
151 Chávez facilitará estadía de Gloria Gaitán en Venezuela. Cadena Global.com. At 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary purpose of this thesis was to answer two major questions. Is 
Plan Colombia creating an imbalance of military power in the region? Does it 
matter? The Colombian-Venezuelan dyad case study represented a very strong 
response to answer these questions. Yes, Plan Colombia has created a military 
imbalance in the region. Moreover, the balance of power does matter because 
there are factors that still represent friction between some countries in the 
Western Hemisphere. There are residual issues that could feed national 
antagonism in Latin America. There are border disputes as well as national 
claims to resources across national borders, which is what fueled the case study 
presented in this thesis. 
Based on the analysis of the development of the distribution of power 
between these two countries after the military implementation of Plan Colombia, 
these are some recommendations that, in the author’s view, should be 
implemented to encourage a peaceful resolution of the multiple conflicts present.    
1. United States of America Recommendations 
The U.S. policy toward Latin America has historically oscillated between 
interventionist impulses and strategic denial.152 During the Cold War, the threat 
for the United States was the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. 
Cuba no longer dominates U.S. geopolitical fears. Today, the threat for the 
United States is drugs. Drugs are considered a national security threat. In the 
1990’s , drugs dominated U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. Hence, drug 
cartels must be defeated in order to secure the United States from the 
consequences created by this threat. 
The U.S policy has been solely to support Colombia in the fight against 
narcotics trafficking. Since 2001, U.S. policy has now shifted to include counter-
terrorism. This policy included aid with military equipment and training assistance 
to Colombian armed forces. Thus, this aid has created a strategic imbalance in  
                                            
152 General Fred, Woerner. Some Thoughts on Hemispheric Security and Leadership. 
Berkley: University of California. 1993. p. 35. 
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the military relations between Colombia and Venezuela. Then, if the balance of 
power does matter in Latin America relations, the implications of this U.S policy 
in the region are very important. 
This thesis recommendation for the U.S. policy maker is to take into 
consideration the implication of addressing the drug problem with military forces 
in the region. It is not just detention and monitoring of drug trafficking as it used 
to be in the 1990’s. It is practically the use of military forces in law enforcement 
activities.   
Perhaps using a different approach to solve the problem will be easier 
than creating the correct conditions for a future conflict in the region. For 
example, it would be possible for U.S. policy maker’s to use  the money directed 
to military aid in Colombia in a demand side strategy, a strategy in which the 
United States will attack the problem fundamentally through education.  
Alternatively, it is imperative to create a different atmosphere in the 
perceptions and misperceptions some countries have in the region. Thus, for the 
regional status quo to be maintained, initiatives must be developed that are 
capable of building a stable, cooperative, hemispheric security framework. 
Hemispheric cooperative security could be defined as “a system of inter-states 
interactions which, by coordinating government policies, anticipates and contains 
threats to national interest and prevents the perception of such threats by the 
different governments from turning into tensions, crisis, or open 
confrontations.”153 
2. Venezuela Recommendations 
Since the times of independence Venezuelan armed forces were created 
to liberate but not to conquer. This premise has established part of the foreign 
policy on the use of Venezuela’s armed forces as a sovereignty state. Under the 
present conditions, the Venezuelan state can take two different approaches.    
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Mechanism and International Security in Latin America, Edit by Olga, Pellicer. New York: The 
United States University Press. 1998. p. 11.     
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According to the theory, the Venezuelan state can take a realistic 
approach. It is to increase military capabilities due to security concerns. It is to 
improve training and capabilities in those areas that are at a disadvantage at the 
moment. Additionally, because the region hegemon is supporting Venezuela’s 
historic confrontational neighbor, it will be straightforward to understand current 
Venezuelan government alliances with U.S. antagonist countries (i.e., Brazil, 
Cuba, China, France, Libya, and Iran). 
On the contrary, a more liberal recommendation could be made. It is to 
implement a regime of transparency between both democracies, or to create a 
bilateral security system which includes improving relations between the armed 
forces of the region. The next step would be to have a transparent relationship 
regime, or in other words, a relationship that is highly focused on internal 
problems and avoids ambiguous purposes (i.e., buying tanks to fight guerrillas or 
MIG-29’s to replace fighters), which could be a way to avoid misperceptions that 
inevitably lead to a spiral model.  
Finally, I will make a more conservative suggestion. It is to increase 
bilateral discussions on the demarcation of maritime limits. Efforts to solve 
delimitations coming from true liberal democracies will produce positive results 
for both countries. Essentially, the solution to diminish the likelihood of military 
conflict is to solve the historical territorial dispute.        
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